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Because what people do individually and collectively is not based solely on what 
they know, the way educators communicate concepts in sustainability education is of 
utmost importance.  Framing may impact recognized antecedents of pro-environmental 
behavior (such as attitudes) as well as traditional educational outcomes (e.g., critical 
thinking).  Because commonly used frames are based in metaphors that tend to portray 
nature as a resource and resist ecological realities (e.g., the finite nature of matter), 
sustainability education may actually undermine pro-environmental behavior.  This study 
examines the impact of framing on critical elaboration in sustainability education.  
Participants were college students in introductory ecology and recreation courses. 
Using a 2x2 fully factorial design, students read text that portrayed humans as either a 
part of nature (systems metaphor) or apart from nature (nonsystems metaphor) in either 
active or passive voice and responded using a thought-listing technique.  Responses were 
then coded for critical elaboration.  Data were analyzed using an analysis of variance, 
which revealed no interaction of voice and metaphor type effects.  A comparison of main 
effects means revealed significant differences.  Frames that used a systems metaphor 
rather than a nonsystems metaphor elicited higher critical elaboration scores.  Frames that 
used active rather than passive voice elicited more critical elaboration. Implications for 
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Pro-environmental behavior, defined as “behavior that consciously seeks to 
minimize the negative impact of one’s actions on the natural and built world” (Kollmuss 
& Agyeman, 2002, p. 240), is a fundamental goal of environmental education.  
According to Worldwatch Institute (2004), “the single-minded pursuit of consumption 
not only will undermine the quality of life of those in the consumer society, it will 
diminish the ability of those outside the consumption class to meet their basic needs” (p. 
xviii – xix), and the major ecological issues facing this generation, from global warming 
to the loss of biodiversity, are the result of this unchecked consumption. The 12% of the 
world's people living in North America and Western Europe account for 60% of resource 
consumption (Assadourian et al., 2004).  In addition, the United States, with just 4.5% of 
the world's population, releases 38% of global carbon dioxide emissions (Energy 
Information Administration, 2005).  These figures illustrate why educators must find a 
way for students, and the population as a whole, to embrace pro-environmental behavior.  
Environmental education, recognized as the origin of sustainability education, has 
been called on to create an ecologically literate population who will actively participate 
in pro-environmental behavior, but success has been mixed (Zelezny, 1999).  One 
important reason for this is the common assumption that knowledge leads directly to 
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behavior, but foundational studies exploring the relation between knowledge and 
behavior have shown that the path is not direct.  It is affected by other variables such as 
attitude and awareness (Borden & Schettino, 1979; Pooley & O'Connor, 2000), 
citizenship and problem-solving skills (Sia, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986), locus of 
control, action skills, personality, knowledge of issues (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 
1986; Hungerford & Volk, 1990), and social feedback and social norms (Schultz, 2000).  
Indeed, in all of the models that have been developed to explain how environmental 
education can lead to pro-environmental behavior, both knowledge and attitude are 
crucial.  Yet sustainability educators often overlook attitudinal change as part of their 
educational mandate, focusing instead on knowledge alone.  This study addresses that 
shortcoming by considering the attitudinal variable as well.  
Because sustainability education is called upon to foster pro-environmental 
behavior, but often neglects important antecedents, this study drew on both the education 
and persuasion literature in using critical elaboration as an outcome of educational 
interventions.  Research in psychology suggests that elaboration, meaning careful 
consideration of an issue, is essential for lasting attitude change (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986; 
Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  Because attitudes “arise spontaneously and inevitably as we 
form beliefs” (Ajzen, 2001, p. 30), education that activates a more careful consideration 
of underlying beliefs is critical.  Further, the result of elaboration is that attitudes will be 
resistant to counter-pressure, and will be more accessible, stable, and likely to impel 
behavior (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  Because both knowledge and attitude are important 
factors in attaining the goals of sustainability education, this study focused on a construct 
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synthesized from the education and attitude literatures.  Specifically, it involved the 
merging of critical thinking and elaboration into what is called critical elaboration.  
Perhaps the best way to activate critical elaboration is framing, the intentional use 
of words to facilitate and shape understanding (Lakoff, 2004).  Framing can influence 
understanding and attitudes (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  It is widely agreed that facts and 
ideas do not exist in isolation in our minds.  Schema theory suggests that one word or fact 
activates a larger mental picture, or schema (Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 
1977; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984).  Humans think using an “extensive, but unconscious, 
system of metaphorical concepts” (Lakoff, 1995, p. 177) and language activates these 
metaphors.  This is especially important in teaching ecology because framing, by 
activating critical elaboration, can challenge common misconceptions resulting from 
cultural metaphors that undermine understanding ecology and the role of humans in 
ecosystems. 
A look at research on ecological misconceptions is illustrative in terms of framing 
and critical elaboration.  Misconceptions about ecology and ecosystem processes, 
including matter cycling, energy flow, and natural selection have been widely studied 
(Armstrong, 1997; Griffiths & Grant, 1985; Hellden, 1995; Munson, 1994; Smith & 
Anderson, 1986).  For example, matter cycling is narrowly understood among students 
who commonly believe that matter is created and destroyed in biological processes 
(Smith & Anderson).  If humans were able to create matter, we would live in a world 
without limits; if humans were able to destroy matter, producing “disposable” items 
would not be an ecological liability.  That matter is limited is rebuffed by consumer 
culture, and misconceptions about the limited nature of matter are at least reinforced, if 
4 
 
not created, in how culture talks about, or frames, these concepts in everyday 
conversation.  From advertising slogans like “Crunch all you want, we’ll make more” 
(Doritos campaign) to ecological textbooks that emphasize the cycling process rather 
than the limited nature of matter (Cachelin, Norvell, & Darling, 2010) to the Guidelines 
for the Initial Preparation For Environmental Educators (Simmons et al., 2004) which 
suggest only that educators should be able to “describe biological, geological, and 
chemical cycles and/or processes that played a prominent role in shaping an ecosystem,” 
(p. xx), a conceptual understanding of matter as finite is not emphasized.  Prevalent 
frames do not challenge students to critically elaborate on the ecological realities of 
matter cycling.  Instead, they conform to culturally-shaped schema in which resources are 
conceived of and experienced as unlimited.  
Syntax is an element of framing that plays an important role in students’ ability to 
evaluate and respond to complex ecological topics and issues (Chenhansa & 
Schleppegrell, 1998).  In science texts, as in science writing, abstract concepts are 
explored using the passive voice as opposed to a more empowering approach.  Concepts 
like habitat loss, biodiversity, population growth, over consumption, and introduced 
species, central to the current study of ecology, are frequently presented as either the 
passive subject or the object of the sentence, meaning that there is no concrete actor.  
Consider, for example, “Bengal tigers once roamed widely across India and Southeast 
Asia. Now they're in trouble because of habitat loss and people killing them illegally for 
their bones, which are used to make traditional Asian medicines” (Braus, 1994, p. 7, as 
cited in Chenhansa & Schleppegrell).  When asked the cause of the tigers’ trouble, 
students overwhelmingly responded that people were killing them, as opposed to 
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mentioning habitat loss, demonstrating, perhaps, the relative strength of active versus 
passive voice (Chenhansa & Schleppegrell).  Syntax can either dissuade or encourage 
involvement and as such it has an important role to play in framing messages to activate 
critical elaboration.  
Additionally, language frames that relegate issues to the category 
“environmental” separate humans from the environment and implicitly make the 
environment less relevant, while consideration of these issues from a social perspective 
involves humans more.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005) provide a powerful example: 
Why, for instance, is a human-made phenomenon like global warming — which 
may kill hundreds of millions of human beings over the next century — 
considered “environmental”? Why are poverty and war not considered 
environmental problems while global warming is? What are the implications of 
framing global warming as an environmental problem – and handing off the 
responsibility for dealing with it to “environmentalists”? (p. 12) 
 
This example makes obvious not only the role that framing can play, but also hints at the 
results of such separation. Perhaps more importantly, Shellenberger and Nordhaus 
suggest that:  
The concepts of “nature” and “environment” have been thoroughly deconstructed. 
Yet they retain their mythic and debilitating power within the environmental 
movement and the public at large. If one understands the notion of the 
“environment” to include humans, then the way the environmental community 
designates certain problems as environmental and others as not is completely 
arbitrary. (p. 12) 
 
The consistently expressed divide between humans and nature is indicative of the 
fundamental problem in the metaphors people live by.  Traditional framing activates the 
metaphorical concept “humans = non-nature” and this conception plays a powerful role in 
shaping the synthesis and interpretation of ecological information.  While students can 
attain an academic understanding that humans are included in natural systems, language, 
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and the metaphors upon which they are based, inhibits students from consistently 
internalizing this knowledge and seeing themselves and their actions as ecologically 
relevant.  This is significant because involvement and relevance have consistently been 
shown to be critical in fostering elaboration (Johnson & Eagly, 1989).  It is also 
promising because dissonance may foster elaboration.  As such, a dissonance-inducing 
frame that intentionally involves humans as a part of the system may provide a powerful 
tool in eliciting critical elaboration.   
Frames may be intentionally manipulated to clarify ecological realities that are 
obscured by language use, and counter the variety of cultural messages that undermine 
critical elaboration and consequently pro-environmental behavior.  For the purposes of 
this research, an active system frame (ASF) was defined as one that takes a systems-
approach to the environment —including humans as a part of rather than apart from 
ecosystems, and uses active rather than passive voice.  For example, teaching students 
that “we are all solar-powered,” a notion which encompasses these criteria, may be more 
meaningful and drive home a more personally relevant conceptualization of the realities 
of energy flow than discussing the laws of thermodynamics.  Similarly, teaching students 
that there is no “away” to which to throw things may provide the much needed impetus 
for critical elaboration that might ultimately result in conservation.  With language being 
constitutive of reality, as much as reflective of it, intentional frames may provide a deeper 
and more lasting understanding of ecology by activating critical elaboration.   
Yet frames that are out of step with common cultural metaphors may elicit 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), a motivational state that can either undermine or 
support critical elaboration.  Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people seek 
7 
 
consistency in their underlying beliefs and thoughts.  As a result, presented with 
dissonant information, people will find a way to make it consistent with their beliefs in 
one of three ways: they will either 1) reject new information and strengthen their own 
ideas rather than challenging existing beliefs, 2) minimize the importance of the 
information such that the inconsistencies become less important, or 3) change their 
attitudes and underlying beliefs (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996). Text that implements language 
frames designed to disrupt the common metaphors society lives by, decentering culturally 
normative messages that displace critical understanding of ecology as a driver of 
behavior, will likely induce cognitive dissonance.  Thus, active systems frames may or 
may not be successful in activating critical elaboration and consequently reaching the 
goals of environmental education.  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine 




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of framing on critical 
elaboration as a proximal goal of environmental education.  To lay the groundwork for 
the study, this chapter reviews four bodies of literature: 1) environmental education as a 
precursor to sustainability education; 2) critical thinking; 3) persuasion/elaboration 




Because the goals of environmental education (EE) are complex, including 
changing knowledge, attitudes, skills, and behavior, EE has met with mixed success.  
Since its inception in the early 1970s, educators have not seen large-scale popular 
engagement in pro-environmental behavior.  To more fully understand this issue, a brief 
consideration of EE’s definition and known impacts along with the different models that 
have been proposed to achieve pro-environmental behavior (PEB) are reviewed. These 
models provide important information about variables that warrant attention in setting up 
educational interventions to be successful in this context.  Guided by this information as 
well as obstacles to past EE success and measurement, a new model, dependent on more 
commonly researched social science theory, is described.  This model provides the 
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structure for exploration into a newly developed dependant variable that works toward 
bridging EE and PEB. 
 
Definition 
The definition of environmental education (EE), described in The Tbilisi Declaration 
(1977), sheds light on the assumptions that have shaped both practice and research in the 
field for many years.  The goals of EE are: 
1. To foster clear awareness of, and concern about, economic, social, political, and 
ecological interdependence in urban and rural areas; 
2. To provide every person with opportunities to acquire the knowledge, values, 
attitudes, commitment, and skills needed to protect and improve the environment; 
3. To create new patterns of behavior of individuals, groups, and society as a whole 
towards the environment. (as cited in Simmons et al., 2004, p. 2) 
 
These goals are extraordinarily diverse, targeting awareness, concern, knowledge, values, 
attitudes, commitment, skills, and behavior.  Drawing on early research efforts, the 
sequencing of these goals implies that PEB will result from the synergy between 
awareness, concern, knowledge, values, attitudes, commitment, and skills.  The extent to 
which it actually does result from these and other variables is debatable.  Moreover, 
measures of success or failure become difficult as this definition encompasses both 
proximal goals (awareness, concern, knowledge, values, attitudes, commitment, and 
skills) and distal goals (pro-environmental behavior in all its forms).  Most environmental 
psychologists and educators believe that environmental education can result in PEB 
(Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Borden & Schettino, 1979; Hammit, Freimund, Watson, Brod, 
& Monz, 1996; Hines et al., 1986; Iozzi, 1989a; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Sia et al., 
1986; Volk & McBeth, 1998; Zelezny, 1999) and the models that are specifically based 




Successes and Failures 
According to the environmental education literature, analyses of environmental 
education programs have demonstrated more success than failure, though significant 
problems have been reported in meta-analyses of EE outcomes.  These problems suggest 
caution in celebrating success (Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Coyle, 2005; Hines et al., 1986; 
Iozzi, 1989b; Leeming, Dwyer, Porter, & Coburn, 1993; Volk & McBeth, 1998; Zelezny, 
1999).  Leeming et al., in their comprehensive outcome research, found that 41% of EE 
interventions resulted in positive effects and another 17% reported mixed effects.  
Zelezny analyzed EE interventions from 1971-1996 and looked at her data in two 
categories: classroom and nontraditional settings.  She found that all classroom 
interventions resulted in improved environmental behavior, and 44% of interventions in 
nontraditional settings reported improved environmental behavior.  Treatment effects (r2) 
for educational interventions in the classroom were 0.65, compared to 0.27 in 
nontraditional setting interventions (Zelezny).  She also found that interventions that 
actively involved participants, interventions with participants younger than 18, and 
interventions with longer dosages were more effective in increasing pro-environmental 
behavior.  Volk and McBeth divided effects into specific outcome categories and found 
that attitude changes occurred 48% of the time that they were targeted; sociopolitical 
knowledge and cognitive skills increased 100% of the time that they were targeted; 
increased ecological knowledge occurred 87.5% of the time that it was targeted; 
knowledge of a specific environmental issue occurred 85% of that time it was targeted; 
and 71% of the programs that targeted responsive environmental behavior were 
successful at some level.  These data appear promising, yet it is worth considering 
11 
 
obstacles to synthesizing these data, particularly in light of the chronic disconnect 
between practitioners and researchers. 
Researchers who conducted these meta analyses universally described obstacles 
(Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Coyle, 2005; Hines et al., 1986; Iozzi, 1989b; Leeming et al., 
1993; Volk & McBeth, 1998; Zelezny, 1999).  The most cited difficulty in accepting 
published successes is the frequent use of self-report data when considering results about 
behavior (Leeming et al.; Zelezny).  Also cited as issues were faulty measurement 
instruments, confusion regarding the unit of analysis as a classroom rather than the 
individual, and the durability of these changes given that follow-up data were 
infrequently collected.  According to Zelezny, of the studies that did in fact measure 
behavior, 89% used self-reported or inferred data rather than observation-based data.  
Self-report issues aside, the lack of a universal measurement instrument for proximal 
goals of EE also presented problems.  Volk and McBeth note that 55% of the studies did 
not include a measure of instrument validity and frequently, measurement tools were 
created for the purpose of individual studies.  Further, all of the outcome research and 
meta analyses cited expressed concern about the lack of follow-up to determine the 
durability of interventions.  Many researchers have investigated the immediate effect of 
short-duration field experiences (Knapp & Barrie, 2001; Knapp & Poff, 2001; Palmberg 
& Kuru, 2000 as cited in Farmer, Knapp, & Benton, 2007), but few have studied the 
long-term effect of such programs.  This is significant in light of the fact that more than 
20 million students visit informal science and environmental field centers each year 
(Ramey, Walberg, & Walberg, 1994 as cited in Farmer et al.).  The National 
Environmental Education Foundation echoes these concerns saying: “many ‘educational’ 
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efforts were really little more than informational excursions and were not having much 
effect at all on creating deep environmental literacy, application skills, or a sense of 
stewardship in young people” (Coyle, 2005).  Further, my experience as a practitioner of 
EE and interim director and board member of the state EE affiliate organization gives me 
the confidence to suggest that most EE programs are conducted by people with little 
training in education or social science, and that program evaluation remains largely 
outside of the expertise of most practitioners.  It is only through national guidelines, 
inconsistently received and understood by practitioners and administrators, that research 
filters down to practice.  Thus, most EE practice goes critically unexamined and as such 
cannot be qualified as a success or failure.  Finally, publication bias is a concern; it is 
likely that only research that shows significant success would be published.  This may be 
especially problematic for summarized research.  Zelezny reported on this issue stating: 
It is possible that the studies that have been published may be biased if they 
include many studies with Type I errors. To rule out this bias, Rosenthal (1979) 
developed a way to quantify the tolerance for null results. Using his method, I 
recorded the exact p values for each study in this review. Using the normal 
distribution table, I converted each p value to a z score. I then summed standard 
normal deviates (zs; ztotal = 28.575) and used them to calculate Rosenthal's 
equation to find the tolerance for null results. According to Rosenthal's 
recommendations, these estimates indicated that the file drawer problem was not 
likely and that the sample for this review was not seriously biased. (¶ 16) 
 
Yet, Zelezny was only one of seven summary documents cited in this section.                   
It is not only the tenuous nature of the published data that undermines confidence 
in the impact of EE, but also its implementation, and its diversion from PEB as a goal 
that pose significant problems.  Environmental education is often implemented as an 
after-thought or a supplement to more established curricula, employing a shotgun 
approach without proper scope, sequence, coherence, and continuity necessary to affect 
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behavioral change.  Further, much current EE practice fails to get to the heart of what EE 
should be –an experience that enhances critical thinking and thus affects PEB.  
Environmental education as it is practiced rarely calls for an examination of underlying 
beliefs and understandings. It has drifted from its initial intent, in part, due to the current 
emphasis on standardization in the quest for wider acceptance.  It is often celebrated as a 
triumph of science learning, and is cited as aiding peripheral goals such as better 
performance on academic achievement tests, reduced discipline and management issues, 
increased enthusiasm, pride, and ownership in accomplishments (Lieberman & Hoody, 
1998).  Yet an exclusive focus on these elements may be undercutting a more goal-
oriented approach to sustainability education.  A return to PEB as a goal, and an 
intentional sequence of educational programming, is essential if EE is to be effective. 
 
Environmental Education Models 
Foundational studies in the EE literature that explore the relationship between 
education and behavior have shown that the path is not a direct one; rather, it is affected 
by many variables such as attitude and awareness (Borden & Schettino, 1979; Pooley & 
O'Connor, 2000); citizenship and problem-solving skills (Sia et al., 1986); locus of 
control, action skills, personality and knowledge of issues (Hines et al., 1986; Hungerford 
& Volk, 1990); personal and collective competence (Chawla, 2007) and both social 
feedback and social norms (Schultz, 2000).  In fact, the contemporary EE literature shows 
increasingly complex models of PEB, illustrating a growing awareness of both the 
indirect relationship between EE and PEB, and the effects of context.  Social science 
theories assert an equally long road between knowledge and behavior, citing similar and 
overlapping issues.  These include motivation and ability to elaborate on messages (Petty 
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& Cacioppi, 1996), norms, control beliefs, and beliefs about particular behaviors (Ajzen, 
1992), and personal norms relating to responsibility and awareness of consequences of 
actions (Schwartz, 1977).  Yet, understanding the relation between the proximal goals of 
EE and their connection to PEB is critical. 
Borden and Schettino first studied the concept of environmental behavior change 
as a result of EE in 1979.  Their work was based on an attitude construct from 
psychology in which attitude has cognitive, affective, and conative (behavioral) 
components, such that knowledge led to awareness, which led to action. Their work 
showed that EE aimed at behavioral change should include both affective and cognitive 
elements, as both were related to verbal and actual commitment to change.  By virtue of 
this work, and the more formalized goals of EE, a linear model for behavioral change 
evolved (Hungerford & Volk, 1990). 
Results of research on this model were mixed.  It became clear that behavior 
change was a more complex concept than was initially understood.  For example, Sia et 
al. (1986) suggested that citizenship and problem-solving skills were being largely 
ignored by environmental educators and began exploring predictive variables including 
environmental sensitivity, environmental action/knowledge skills, locus of control, 
personal attributes, and attitudes about pollution/technology.  They found that 
environmental problem-solving skills and citizenship participation were strong predictors 
of behavior change. 
Hines et al. (1986), Figure 1, proposed a new and more realistic model of PEB.  
This model represents a logical progression from the research that had been done.  In this 




Figure 1: Hines: EE Model, 1986, p. 7 
Reprinted with permission from Taylor and Francis. 
 
This is because an individual who intends to act will more likely do so and “it appears 
that the intention to act is merely an artifact of a number of other variables acting in 
combination” (Hines et al., 1986, p.6).  The addition of situational factors is important 
because such factors often undermine the intention – behavior relation.  Examples of such 
situational variables are economic and social pressures.  Additionally, research 
supporting this model calls for an emergence of greater specificity about attitude and 
knowledge constructs needed for change to occur (Hines et al., 1986).  This model shares 
much with the more commonly accepted theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980), later modified to be the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1992). 
Research on the Hines model suggested to Hungerford and Volk (1990) that the 
relationship was yet more complex.  They proposed entry-level or prerequisite variables, 
including environmental sensitivity, knowledge of ecology, and attitudes toward 
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pollution and technology (see Table 1).  These things in combination with ownership 
variables and empowerment variables would lead to “citizenship behavior.”  While 
ownership variables were present in prior models under the name of knowledge, they 
differ a bit here in that this ownership knowledge is issue-based and accompanied by a 
personal investment.  The final steps, empowerment variables, include knowledge and 
skill in using environmental action strategies, locus of control, and intention to act.  
Interestingly, this model is the first to consider citizenship behavior the equivalent of 
PEB, yet this nuance remains unexplored.  Curricula were designed that incorporated 
many of these variables in a model known as issue investigation and action training.  This 
model has proven successful in achieving PEB in many studies (Culen, 1994; Ramsey, 
1993; Sobel, 2004; Wals, 1990).  The incorporation of issue investigation combined with 
community participation underlies place-based education as well (Sobel, 2004).  In fact, 
these approaches have been so successful that they are being advocated today by the  
Table 1: Hungerford and Volk: EE Model, 1990, p. 10 
Reprinted with permission from Taylor and Francis. 
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National Environmental Education Foundation (Coyle, 2005). 
More recently, Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) proposed the following model (see 
Figure 2).  The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), which suggests 
beliefs and attitudes will result in rational behavior, and social learning theory, which 
emphasizes social factors of learning, support the notion that both sociological and 
individual factors are important influences on behavior.  Also of note is that the literature 
examined thus far fails to give external cultural variables such as social marketing their 
due (Coyle, 2005; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Yet, in the EE model (Figure 2), these 
variables are included.  In addition, the underpinnings of constructivist learning theory 
(Ausubel, 1968, p. 140) are now explicit in the attention paid to misconceptions and 
blockages to learning and to enacting PEB. 
 
Recent Trends 
While there are elements of respected social science theories in all of these 
models, researchers (Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson, & Garling, 
2008; Wall, Devine-Wright, & Mill, 2007) are beginning to suggest that the key 
theoretical underpinnings for PEB should include an integration of the theory of planned 
behavior (Azjen, 1991) and norm activation theory (Schwartz, 1977).  These theories are 
well combined because the first was a hedonistic model, while the second was based on 
prosocial motives, and PEB is described as a mixture of both (Bamberg & Moser, 2007).  
Norm activation theory explained pro-environmental behaviors “like energy conservation 
(Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985), recycling (Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995), travel 




Figure 2: Kollmuss & Agyeman: EE Model, 2002, p. 257 
Reprinted with permission from Taylor and Francis 
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buying (Thorgersen, 1999).  Further, they noted that Hines et al. (1986) found a mean 
correlation of r = 0.33 between a feeling of moral obligation to preserve the environment 
and pro-environmental behavior.  Figure 3, a model from Bamberg and Moser (2007) 
merges the theory of planned behavior and norm activation theory in the path to PEB 
using hierarchical linear modeling to do an analysis.  While this model does a good job of 
synthesizing important theories, and utilizes measurement tools that are more widely 
accepted, its focus is almost exclusively on attitude-behavior consistency rather than the 
generation of attitudes and knowledge.  
A more complete model would include knowledge construction and attitude 
change as well as elements from norm activation theory and the theory of planned 
behavior.  The ideal study would measure impact at many different junctures in a larger 
model, much like what is attempted below, and would need to include an educational 
 
Figure 3; Bamberg & Moser’s EE Model, 2007, p. 16 
 
Reprinted from Environmental Psychology, 27 /1, Bamberg, S. & Moser, G., Twenty 
years after Hines, Hungerford, and Tomera: A new meta-analysis of psycho-social 




intervention that would get at knowledge construction and attitude change.  In the section 
that follows, a new model based on the literature, with a focus on one specific part of the  
model that is appropriate to the researcher’s educational philosophy — interventions 
designed for knowledge gain and attitude change is presented. 
A New Model 
While one goal of EE is to “create new patterns of behavior of individuals, groups 
and society as a whole towards the environment” (Tbilisi declaration as cited in Simmons 
et al., 2004, p. 1), the EE literature is perpetually careful to make a distinction between 
education and advocacy.  Some environmental educators are uncomfortable with the goal 
of changing behavior as an intentional outcome of education.  Others are conflicted by 
the clear necessity for behavior change in the current crisis of consumption.  These 
differences have implications for research as they place differential levels of focus on 
differing outcome variables. 
Much of this debate in research purpose may be considered in light of theoretical 
foundations in education, such as behaviorism vs. constructivism.  The basic premise of 
constructivism is that students build their own knowledge as opposed to being filled with 
the knowledge of others (Brooks & Brooks, 1999).  Knowledge construction is both an 
individual and social pursuit, such that all students have experientially-gained 
conceptions of how the world works before formal education begins, and as it proceeds.  
Rather than a more behavioral approach, in which students are regarded as clay for 
teachers to sculpt (Courtney-Hall & Rogers, 2002), students are recognized instead as 
emerging thinkers (Brooks & Brooks, 1999).  Courtney-Hall and Rogers (2002), 
highlight behaviorist tendencies of many PEB models saying “as an education program 
21 
 
focuses on promoting a certain class of behaviors conceptualized as being only tenuously 
linked to student knowledge and understanding, it moves out of the territory of educating 
students and into the territory of conditioning” (p. 285).  At first glance, PEB models may 
seem to bring this research out of step with current constructivist educational theory, but 
because knowledge and attitude change are elements in this model, this criticism is 
simplistic.  For constructivists, behavioral change is an informed and critical decision of 
the student, rather than an act of conditioning that disenfranchises students by attempting 
to translate knowledge directly into behavior.  From this perspective, students should be 
encouraged to think critically and act responsibly, making their own decisions about what 
PEB is and how they will participate in their communities, even if this approach is more 
difficult and less effective than behavioral conditioning.  Because this distinction is such 
an important one, measuring critical thinking and message elaboration is crucial to this 
model. 
Perhaps using behavior to gauge the success of an educational program is a 
limited metric because while one thing may lead to the other, the potential secondary 
outcome is not an appropriate measure of the whole.  In 1944, noted conservationist Aldo 
Leopold wrote: “acts of conservation without the requisite desires and skill are futile.  To 
create these desires and skills, and the community motive, is the task of education” 
(Coyle, 2005, p. ii).  Perhaps, knowledge and attitude change are a sound proximal goal 
for environmental education overall.  
The model proposed to achieve PEB is the integration of the models discussed 
previously (see Figure 4).  This model is compelling for several reasons.  It is a logical  
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Figure 4: Proposed EE Model 
 
synthesis of the previous models integrating theories from EE, persuasion, and social 
psychology.  It includes important feedback loops that might attend to some of the issues 
with durability of interventions; that is, PEB will reinforce norms and norms will  
naturally reinforce the intervention.  Because it implements well-respected social science 
theories, the measurement tools and techniques are well-considered.  This model 
introduces an intervention to precede attitude change and perceived behavioral control 
using the Elaboration Likelihood Model of attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) to 
provide a theoretical foundation for attitude durability, while incorporating critical 
thinking.  Lastly, it shows that many of the elements in the model will be directly or 
indirectly affected by the proposed intervention.  The shaded portion of this model, and 





 Based on the goals, known impacts, and measurement challenges of 
environmental education, as well as the models upon which this new approach is based, 
critical elaboration may provide an important construct for environmental education.  
Specifically, critical elaboration was designed to synthesize knowledge and attitude, 
variables common to all EE models, in the complex and indirect path from education to 




Because both knowledge and attitude are critical in reaching the goals of 
environmental education, critical elaboration, a construct designed for this study, offers 
an important new synthesis.  Critical elaboration originates in research from the fields of 
education, from which critical thinking arose, and psychology, specifically the persuasion 
literature, from which elaboration arose.  To understand this term and what this synthesis 
brings to further understanding in the environmental education field, it is necessary to 
first look at definitions and conceptual development of both critical thinking and 
elaboration.  After an exploration of the histories and definitions of critical thinking and 
elaboration, and exploring the importance of their synthesis, I describe how these 




History and definitions.  The inception of the idea of critical thinking is most 
commonly sourced to Socrates (Fasko, 2003; Kurfiss, 1988).  While the term critical 
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thinking does not show up in the work of that time, the essence of the idea is rooted there.  
In Meno, Socrates believes that knowledge is something that resides within the individual 
and is drawn out through questioning observations and experiences.  Said a different way, 
the process of reason is what draws knowledge forth. In this vignette, Socrates discusses 
teaching with Meno.  
I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine 
that you will involve me in a contradiction…Do you see, Meno, what advances he 
has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not 
know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he 
knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has 
a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows…We have certainly, as 
would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he 
will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all 
the world again and again that the double space should have a double side. But do 
you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that 
he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity 
under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?...And I, Meno, like 
what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. 
But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought 
to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there 
was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;-that is a 
theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my 
power. (p. 366) 
 
Perhaps the idea that knowledge is within, while contrary to most common teaching 
practice today, is consistent with classical times given that the Latin word for education, 
educare, literally means to draw forth.  Thus, for Socrates, critical thinking is a process of 
gaining knowledge through reasoning from experience. 
In 1933, John Dewey discussed similar ideas, though he did not use the term 
critical thinking either.  He used the term reflective thinking, defined as "active, 
persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the 
light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusion to which it tends" (Dewey, 
1933, p. 6).  Fisher (2001) points out that Dewey’s use of “support” and “conclusions” 
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are really the same as reason and implications, making critical reflection fit very well 
with Socrates’s notion of critical thinking as a process of reasoning.  As with Meno’s 
slave, the reflective learner does not receive information passively, but becomes 
perplexed and then uses reason to fit ideas in with what is already known, with what 
supports these ideas and where these ideas lead.  In other words, for Dewey, thinking is a 
very active process based on integrating information and experience in the construction 
of knowledge. 
Among the most influential thinkers in critical thinking are Paul Glaser and 
Robert Ennis whose contributions helped to further define critical thinking.  In 1941, 
Glaser defined critical thinking as “an attitude of being disposed to consider in a 
thoughtful way the problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s 
experiences, knowledge of methods of logical inquiry and reasoning, and some skill in 
applying those methods” (as cited in Walters, 1994, p. 8). His definition is the first which 
explicitly cites disposition as important, an element which is now present in many 
definitions of critical thinking.  The scholar most frequently associated with critical 
thinking is Robert Ennis.  He initially defined critical thinking as “the correct assessment 
of statements” (as cited in Kurfiss, 1988, p. 8) but more recently, he has defined it as 
“reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused on deciding on what to think or do” 
(Ennis, 1985, p. 45).  For him, critical thinking is a process with specific dispositions 
(attitudes and inclinations) that underlie it.  Interestingly, this is the first definition that 
includes both cognition and behavior in the use of “what to believe or to do.”  In this 
sense, his definition is troubling, since people often do not act in accordance with their 




Figure 5: Critical Thinking Model: Ennis, 1985, p. 47 
Reprinted with permission from ASCD. 
 
indicates that dispositions are foundational to critical thinking, and that thinking is an 
active process based on information and conclusions from experience.  From this 
platform, deduction, induction, and judgment occur.  Further, according to this model, 
critical thinking shapes beliefs.  Below are the dispositions and abilities that Ennis feels 
constitute a critical thinker.  
Dispositions 
1. to be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise 
communicated 
2. to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question 
3. to take into account the total situation 
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4. to seek and offer reasons 
5. to try to be well informed 
6. to look for alternatives 
7. to seek as much precision as the situation requires 
8. to try to be reflectively aware of one's own basic beliefs 
9. to be open-minded: consider seriously other points of view than one's own 
10. to withhold judgment when the evidence and reasons are insufficient 
11. to take a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are 
sufficient to do so 
12. to use one's critical thinking abilities 
Abilities 
1. to identify the focus: the issue, question, or conclusion 
2. to analyze arguments 
3. to ask and answer questions of clarification and/or challenge 
4. to define terms, judge definitions, and deal with equivocation 
5. to identify unstated assumptions 
6. to judge the credibility of a source 
7. to observe, and judge observation reports 
8. to deduce, and judge deductions 
9. to induce, and judge inductions 
10. to make and judge value judgment 
11. to consider and reason from premises, reasons, assumptions, positions, and other 
propositions with which one disagrees or about which one is in doubt—without 
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letting the disagreement or doubt interfere with one's thinking ("suppositional 
thinking") 
12. to integrate the other abilities and dispositions in making and defending a decision 
Identifying these specific dispositions and skills has led Ennis to coauthor the widely 
used Cornell critical thinking test and the Ennis-Weir critical thinking test, yet neither of 
these instruments measure dispositional attributes. They only measure skills. 
With the publication of Nation at Risk (1983) and its findings that America’s 
educational system was in trouble, educators looked to teaching for critical thinking as 
one possible solution, and as such needed a firm definition.  Because such a diversity of 
perspectives on, and definitions of, critical thinking existed, the APA commissioned Peter 
Facione to work with scholars and come to a consensual definition “for the purposes of 
education and assessment” (Facione, 1990, p. 2). He gathered experts in philosophy, 
education, the social sciences, and the physical sciences (including Robert Ennis) to 
participate in a qualitative process to create The Delphi Report.  These scholars came up 
with the following definition: 
We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which 
results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation 
of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual 
considerations upon which that judgment is based.  It combines developing 
critical thinking skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield 
useful insights and which are the basis of a rational and democratic society. 
(Facione, 1990, p. 2) 
 
In this definition, attention is given to both skills and dispositions. The authors go on to 
suggest that: 
Although the language here is metaphorical, one would find the panelists to be in 
general accord with the view that there is a critical spirit, a probing 
inquisitiveness, a keenness of mind, a zealous dedication to reason, and a hunger 
or eagerness for reliable information which good critical thinkers possess but 
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weak critical thinkers do not seem to have. As water strengthens a thirsty plant, 
the affective dispositions are necessary for the critical thinking skills identified to 
take root and to flourish in students. (Facione, 1990, p. 11)  
 
Practical consideration of this dispositional element has caused others to suggest that 
perhaps critical thinking is best conceived as episodic (McCarthy, 1992)  To extend the 
metaphor would be to say that plants are not always thirsty, but sometimes they do need 
water.  This is an important distinction as it suggests that students do not necessarily 
develop a dispositional trait to think critically, but rather that critical thinking is a discrete 
activity elicited only in certain instances.  This episodic interpretation also implies that 
critical thinking skills are present (to a greater or lesser extent) in all individuals. While 
there is recent dialogue about this aspect of critical thinking, it remains a minority 
opinion. 
 Understanding the history and current definitions of critical thinking is important, 
not only because critical thinking itself is an important goal for all educators, but more 
specifically because knowledge grows by linking new information to what is already 
known or understood, and critical thinking is the process by which that occurs (Halpern, 
1996).  It is worthwhile to explicitly state that critical thinking as a measure of education 
mandated by the authors of A Nation at Risk and more recently, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, calls for skills and abilities far deeper than 
just recall.  Current education is criticized for emphasizing “the learning of answers more 
than the exploration of questions, memory at the expense of critical thought, bits and 
pieces of information instead of understandings in context, recitation over argument, 
reading in lieu of doing” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990, 
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History and definitions. Based in research in attitude change, elaboration is a 
construct designed to deal explicitly with exposure to persuasive messages intended to 
change attitudes.  Early research on attitude change explored many variables including 
source (attractiveness and credibility), message recipient (ego-involvement), and effect of 
the message delivery system itself.  While much data were collected, very little 
consistency among results existed.  In fact, after several decades of attitude research, few 
generalizations could be made about how to change attitudes (Himmelfarb & Eagly, 
1974).  After a careful review of the literature, researchers (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986) 
began trying to integrate these conflicting results in looking at different routes to 
persuasion, or different ways that persuasive messages get processed.  Dual-process 
models, including the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986) and the 
Heuristic Systematic Model, (Chaiken et al. 1989 as cited in Petty & Cacioppi, 1986) 
have been successful in providing a theoretical framework for attitude change.  These 
models suggest that if message receivers are neither able nor motivated, message 
processing will occur through a peripheral route.  Peripheral cues used might include 
source attractiveness or mental shortcuts, called heuristics, like “dad’s usually right” 
(Crano & Prislin, 2006).  If, on the other hand, motivation and ability are present, central 
route or systematic processing using elaboration will occur.  The development of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model gave attitude change researchers a comprehensive 
framework for understanding persuasion that still guides attitude research today (Petty, 
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Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997).  Research using this framework has shown that elaboration 
itself is critical because it produces attitudes that are more resistant to counter pressure, 
more stable, and more likely to impel behavior than those formed through peripheral cues 
(Petty & Cacioppi, 1986; Petty & Cacioppi, 1996). 
Elaboration has been defined in many different ways in the attitude literature 
including the following: to systematically analyze (Crano & Prislin, 2006); to process 
(Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2007); to think about, (Fleming & Petty, 2000; Jones, Sinclair, 
& Courneya, 2003); an effortful, issue-relevant cognitive activity (Petty & Cacioppi, 
1996); careful and thoughtful consideration of the true merits of information (Petty & 
Cacioppi, 1986); evaluation of arguments for a recommendation (Petty & Cacioppi, 
1986); and integration [of information] into an overall position (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986).  
While definitions of critical thinking and elaboration are very similar, there are some 
important distinctions that warranted the combination of both for the purposes of this 
study. 
 The synthesis.  Differences in the origins, theoretical uses, and measurement of 
critical thinking and elaboration suggest their synthesis will make an important 
contribution to research in environmental education. Both elaboration and critical 
thinking recognize the importance of ability yet the critical thinking literature is 
predominantly based in the idea that ability works in concert with disposition (Ennis, 
1985; Facione, 1990) to create critical thinkers, while research in elaboration emphasizes 
ability that works in concert with motivation to activate elaboration (Petty & Cacioppi, 
1986; Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  This seemingly subtle difference reveals a key point of 
divergence in critical thinking and elaboration, one that has shaped measurement of these 
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two constructs, and one that argues for their complementary nature in the context of EE.  
Critical thinking is conceived as based on a tendency, or habit of mind, whereas 
elaboration is conceived as something which can be activated using various techniques.  
Consequently, critical thinking assumes that there is a set of skills or abilities that is only 
possessed by critical thinkers (though there are techniques to cultivate these skills), while 
the elaboration likelihood model suggests that messages can be crafted to activate the 
motivations and abilities necessary to elaborate.  Because of their different histories and 
baseline assumptions, their measurement has traditionally been different.   
 
Measuring Critical Thinking and Elaboration 
Critical thinking. Most critical thinking tests use a multiple choice and/or short 
answer format to test reasoning, argument analysis, deduction, and assumption 
identification.  Test questions may be based on reading passages or arguments.  There are 
more than 20 well-known general critical thinking tests and at least two subject-specific 
science and math tests (Ennis, 2006).  All of these tests are designed to examine critical 
thinking as a skill except one that is designed to measure disposition.  Often the 
disposition survey is used in combination with one of the skills exams.  By and large, the 
format of these tests does not support the notion that critical thinking is subject-specific 
and seems to minimize the importance of disposition.  The fact that these tests fall short 
of total resonance with the conceptual definitions of critical thinking, in that it is tested as 
episodic, makes it seem even more similar to the concept of elaboration, which is 
measured much differently. 
Elaboration.  Elaboration has been measured in four ways: self-reports, argument 
recall, thought-listing, and electrophysiological responses (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986).  
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Self-report measurements entail asking participants the extent to which they were trying 
to evaluate the message and /or the number of thoughts that they had pertaining to the 
message.  Problems with this technique include participants having limited access to their 
own cognitive processes, and lack of ability of participants to recognize cognitive effort 
related to peripheral cues.  Similarly, argument recall, or asking participants to list the 
arguments made in the message, is an imperfect measure of encoding efficacy (Petty & 
Cacioppi, 1996); listing the arguments may not give insight into the amount of cognitive 
elaboration it took to process them.  The thought-listing technique is the most commonly 
used in elaboration measurement (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  In this technique, students 
are given the following instructions after being exposed to message text: 
We are now interested in what you were thinking as you read the text just given to 
you.  You might have had ideas all favorable to the ideas, all opposed, all 
irrelevant to the idea, or a mixture of all three.  Any case is fine; simply list what 
you where thinking during the last few minutes.  The next page is for you to 
record your thoughts.  Simply write down the first idea that comes to mind in the 
first box, the second idea in the second box, etc.  Please put only one thought or 
idea in a box.  You should try to record only those ideas that you were thinking in 
the last few minutes.  Please state your thoughts and ideas as concisely as 
possible…a phrase is sufficient.  Ignore spelling, grammar, and punctuation.  You 
will have 2.5 minutes to write your thoughts.  We have deliberately provided 
more space than we think most people will need to ensure that everyone would 
have plenty of room to write the ideas they had as they were reading the text.  So 
don’t worry of you don’t fill every space.  Just write down whatever your 
thoughts were during the last few minutes.  Please be completely honest and list 
all of the thoughts you had. (adapted from Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 38) 
 
Responses are then quantified in terms of how many issue-relevant thoughts are listed, 
and the profile of favorable vs. unfavorable issue-relevant thoughts. 
Each of these measures alone falls short of the goal of measuring antecedents of 
knowledge and attitude, but their combination, using a thought-listing technique and 
coding for statements that show both favorable and unfavorable thoughts and evaluative 
34 
 
skills, such as identifying assumptions, may be valuable in structuring a measurement 
tool in keeping with important elements of environmental education models.  For these 
reasons, critical elaboration was a fitting variable for this study. 
 
Critical Elaboration Defined 
 For the purposes of this study, critical elaboration was defined as careful 
consideration of an issue characterized by thoughtful critique.  Thinking skills utilized in 
critical elaboration include identifying unstated assumptions, questioning such 
assumptions, suggesting alternatives, seeking clarification and/or challenge, taking a 
position (and changing a position) when the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so, 
looking for alternatives, and deriving an overall evaluation of, or attitude toward, the 
issue being presented.  This construct was measured using a modified thought-listing 
technique. 
 
Fostering Critical Elaboration 
 In light of the idea that critical thinking can be developed through education over 
many years and elaboration can be activated through various message techniques, it is 
necessary to understand what is known about fostering both processes.  In this section, 
instructional strategies for critical thinking are discussed as are techniques for activating 
elaboration.   
 Critical thinking instructional strategies.  Can critical thinking be taught and 
tested as a set of skills? Would these skills transfer to all disciplines?  If the testing of 
critical thinking skills is emphasized, must they be taught, or are they inherent in solid 
instruction of any topic?  Is it necessary to teach and test dispositions?  These are the 
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questions that dominated the critical thinking literature in the1980s and 90s and remain 
unanswered today. 
Four different approaches to critical thinking instruction have been debated in the 
literature as have specific instructional strategies.  The first, termed the general approach, 
suggests that critical thinking is not subject-specific and can be taught independent of 
topic.  According to Ennis, (1989) who advocates this general approach, conceiving of 
critical thinking as subject-specific is akin to suggesting that when “we write or speak, 
we are writing or speaking about something, [and thus] there can be no teaching of 
general writing or speaking skills ” (1996 p. 6).  Others (Glaser, 1985; Resnick, 1987) 
advocate the infusion approach —that critical thinking skills are taught and made explicit 
within a certain subject matter.  For instance, in teaching ecology, an instructor would not 
only model critical thinking, but also teach the general skills and dispositions of critical 
thinking within deep instruction of the concepts and processes of ecology.  This context 
is necessary because in order to think critically about something, students must have the 
content knowledge and familiarity with the language of the discipline.  The immersion 
approach is “instruction in which students do get deeply immersed in the subject” but the 
teaching of critical thinking skills themselves is not necessary (McPeck, 1981 as cited in 
Ennis, 1989, p. 5).  Lastly, there is a mixed approach in which critical thinking skills are 
taught explicitly, but separately from the subject matter.  This approach finds support 
from Ennis (1985), Sternberg (1987), Nickerson (1988), and Perkins and Salomon (1989) 
as cited in Ennis 1989.  These larger approaches aside, specific strategies for instruction 
have also been proposed.  A 1988 report to the Association for the Study of Higher 
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Education suggests that there are there are five key strategies to foster critical thinking 
which include the following: 
1. Start with a problem and link it to a context with which students are familiar (i.e., 
use inquiry) 
2. Teach modeling, coaching, reasoning skills, and explain when and how to use 
them 
3. Use metacognitive prompts 
4. Understand and challenge misconceptions 
5. Motivate students with cognitive and social strategies. (Kurfiss, 1988)  
Additionally, this report encourages educators to integrate students’ personal concerns in 
teaching and have students take the point of views of others (Kurfiss, 1988).   
 Fostering elaboration. With both ability and motivation identified as important 
factors, fostering elaboration involves both message content and context.  Many studies 
have manipulated the message content, frame, and style of delivery to explore the effects 
of these changes on elaboration. Context, or environmental factors, can also be designed 
to maximize elaboration likelihood.  In this section, relevant studies are discussed.  
 To foster elaboration, Petty and Cacioppi (1986) suggest several important 
variables including message complexity, environmental distractions, argument quality, 
and even body posture.  Messages that are either complex or not comprehensive tend to 
deter ability for elaboration.  Distractions or message disruptions affect ability to 
elaborate such that strong arguments are not accepted as they would be without 
distraction and weak arguments are not rejected as they would be without distraction.  
Strong arguments are ones “containing arguments such that when subjects are instructed 
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to think about the message, the thoughts that they generate are predominantly favorable” 
(Petty & Cacioppi, 1986, p. 32), whereas weak messages are only “ostensibly in favor of 
the advocacy.”  The arguments in weak messages are such that when subjects are 
instructed to think about them, the thoughts that they generate are predominantly 
unfavorable” (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986, p. 32).  Other studies suggest that body posture 
and heart rate can play a role in ability to elaborate.   
 In terms of motivation to elaborate, dozens of factors have been identified 
including need for cognition (Petty & Cacioppi, 1986), involvement (Johnson & Eagly, 
1989), message source (Petty et al., 1997; Priester & Petty, 2003), language (Areni, 2003; 
Areni, Ferrell, & Wilcox, 2000; Areni & Sparks, 2005), forewarning (Petty et al., 1997), 
group discussions (Werner, White, Byerly, & Stoll, 2009), validation (Werner, Stoll, 
Birch, & White, 2002), cognitive consistency (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996), and message 
framing.  Because this study was based on motivation to elaborate (and sampling dealt 
with ability to elaborate), it is necessary to understand the impact of many of these 
variables and how they argue for the strength of the message frame under study.  
Specifically, in this section, need for cognition, cognitive consistency, involvement, 
message framing, and language are discussed. 
 Need for cognition is the only recognized intrinsic motivation for elaboration.  
The need for cognition is described by Petty and Cacioppi (1982) as the statistical 
tendency of, and intrinsic enjoyment individuals derive from, engaging in effortful 
cognitive activities.  Largely based on the idea that humans do not possess unlimited 
energy for effortful problem-solving, those low in need for cognition are described as 
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cognitive misers.  This distinction provides a way to assess chronic individual differences 
in elaboration likelihood. 
 Cognitive congruency theories are based on the idea that humans have mental 
organizing systems, or schemata, that allow them to see the world as somewhat stable and 
predictable.  These systems are networked cognitions, or thoughts, and it is important that 
balance and congruence in these cognitions be maintained.  Thus, information or 
persuasive messages are considered in light of cognitive networks into which they might 
fit (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  Consistency theories suggest that this congruence in light 
of new information is so important that maintaining consistency provides motivation to 
elaborate.  Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is the most popular of these 
cognitive congruence theories and suggests that maintaining consistency is not as 
straightforward as might be anticipated.  When presented with information that 
disconfirms salient beliefs, people will find a way to make this information consistent 
with their beliefs in one of three ways. They will either: 1) reject new information and 
strengthen their own ideas by rehearsing entrenched thoughts and generating counter-
arguments; 2) minimize the importance of the information such that the inconsistencies 
become too unimportant to expend limited cognitive energy; or 3) change their attitudes 
and underlying beliefs (Petty & Cacioppi, 1996).  How exactly they choose to maintain 
consistency is in itself a critically important factor for cognitive elaboration, and here 
involvement plays a role. 
 A meta-analysis of involvement in the persuasion literature sorts involvement into 
three distinct categories: Value-Relevant, Impression-Relevant, and Outcome-Relevant 
(Johnson & Eagly, 1989).  Value-relevant involvement includes messages that are 
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aligned with the recipient’s self-concept and values.  Value-relevant messages tap into 
ideas that are very important to the recipient, ideas that may be a part of one’s ego.  For 
example, marathon runners are likely to consider running as a part of their identity.  As 
such, messages about running are likely to be value-relevant to them.  Similarly, prior 
experience with the topic of a message increases elaboration because people are more 
able to critique message content.  Outcome-relevant involvement describes messages that 
relate directly to the participant’s experiences and/or goals.  For example, studies were 
conducted on college campuses in which messages suggested making comprehensive 
exams mandatory in a time frame that would affect students’ experiences directly, 
elicited a high outcome involvement.  Conversely, similar messages about comprehensive 
exams were given to students such that students at another college would be affected 
rather than themselves, creating a low involvement condition.  Finally, impression-
relevant involvement is based on self-presentational ideas or the impression one makes 
on others “holding an opinion that is socially acceptable to potential evaluators” (Johnson 
& Eagly, 1989, p. 292) such that reactions to messages that will be seen or evaluated will 
often be centrist rather than extreme positions to better manage impressions.  
Involvement as a multidimensional construct along these three lines was 
supported by content validity data (McCarty, 2005), which further suggested: 
each type of involvement has a different pattern of relationships with other 
variables.  For example, because impression-relevant involvement was the only 
type of involvement that was consistently associated positively with other 
directedness, it is distinguishable from value- and outcome-relevant involvement.  
Furthermore, outcome-relevant involvement is distinguished from the other types 
of involvement by its strong association with information seeking.  Although 
value-relevant involvement was also associated with information seeking for 
some topics, these effects were inconsistent and less substantial than those for 
outcome-relevant involvement. Finally, value-relevant involvement is 
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differentiated from impression-relevant involvement because of its substantial 
relationship with attitude extremity. (p. 256)   
 
Fostering involvement is key to increasing critical elaboration. 
 
An understanding that knowledge and attitude are both crucial to fostering pro-
environmental behavior suggests that critical elaboration will be a valuable construct in 
the context of environmental education.  Using techniques to foster critical thinking and 
central route processing will enable educators to attend to critical elements of both 
knowledge and attitude.  These techniques include making topics relevant, challenging 
misconceptions, and using messages designed to foster involvement and cognitive 




 Through framing, the intentional use of words and metaphor to facilitate and 
shape understanding, instructional interventions can be created that may facilitate 
reaching the goals of environmental education.  Given the workings of schema theory, 
frames that integrate differing levels of involvement, dissonance, and relevance should 
promote critical elaboration.  In this section, after a brief description of the definition and 
history of framing and its theoretical underpinnings in schema theory, the traditional 
frames used in EE are considered as are the reasons that changing frames is likely to 
foster critical elaboration.  Finally, parameters for the creation of new frames to impact 
critical elaboration are defined. 
 
Definition and Theoretical Basis 
 Frames were initially conceived as internal cognitive structures that organize the 
way people think (Carroll, 1956; Derry, 1996; Lakoff, 2004).  While this conception of 
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framing still dominates much of the literature in cognitive science and education, an 
alternate conception of framing as a set of external, socially-constructed ideas also has a 
strong presence, particularly in the fields of communication, anthropology, and political 
science.  Whether considered an internal cognitive construction or a set of understandings 
informed by cultural practices, frames have been shown to be powerful tools for 
understanding.  
 Cognitive perspective on framing.  Cognitive scientists describe frames as “the 
mental structures that shape the way we see the world” (Lakoff, 2004, p. xv).  People 
cannot consciously access frames because they are part of the cognitive unconscious, but, 
“when you hear a word, its frame is activated in your brain” (Lakoff, 2004, p. xv).  In this 
sense, frames can be interpreted as individual organizing structures for new information 
and knowledge. 
Education researchers label these cognitive structures of the mind schemata and 
find these structures useful in understanding how comprehension works.  Piaget 
described the learning process as one where these schemata grow and change with 
experience (Martin, 1999).  Similarly, Brewer and Nakamura (1984), described schemata 
as “higher-order cognitive structures that have been hypothesized to underlie many 
aspects of human knowledge and skill” and further suggested that “they serve a crucial 
role in providing an account of how old knowledge interacts with new knowledge in 
perception, language, thought, and memory” (as cited in McVee, Dunsmore, & Gavelek, 
2005, p. 537).  Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) describe how schemata organize memory in 
defining schemata as “data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in 
memory [that exist for] generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, 
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sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions” (as cited in McVee et al., 2005, p. 
536). Finally, Anderson and Pearson (1984) more specifically describe the function of 
schemata in reading as “a structure that facilitates planful retrieval of text information 
from memory and permits reconstruction of elements that were not learned or have been 
forgotten” (as cited in McVee et al., 2005, p. 537).  For example, students with different 
interests were given passages to read such as the following: 
Rocky slowly got up from the mat, planning his escape.  He hesitated a moment 
and thought.  Things were not going well.  What bothered him most was being 
held, especially since the charge against him had been weak.  He considered the 
present situation.  The lock that held him was strong, but he thought he could 
break it.  He knew, however, that his timing would have to be perfect.  Rocky was 
aware that it was because of his early roughness that he had been penalized so 
severely—much too severely from his point of view.  The situation was becoming 
frustrating; the pressure had been grinding on him for too long.  He was being 
ridden unmercifully.  Rocky was getting angry now.  He felt he was ready to 
make his move.  He knew that his success or failure would depend on what he did 
in the next few seconds. (Anderson et al., 1977, p. 372) 
 
This passage can be interpreted as either a wrestling match, or a prison break.  As 
hypothesized and shown through the completion of disambiguation multiple choice tests, 
the students’ backgrounds were predictive of their interpretation of the passage 
(Anderson et al., 1977).  Further, more than 80% of these students had no awareness of 
the alternative perspective while reading.  These data suggest that “high-level schemata 
provide the interpretative framework for comprehending discourse” (Anderson et al., 
1977, p. 367).  Similarly, in reading letters about an Indian and American wedding, 
citizens read passages about their native home more quickly, recalled more information 
from native passages, and produced less distortion of native passages (Steffensen, Joag-
Dev, & Anderson, 1979).  Finally, 4-year-old children when asked to remember and 
reconstruct the layout of a model kitchen, added things from their own experience of a 
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kitchen, rather than using only the items in the model kitchen they had seen (Blades & 
Banham, 1990).  For education theorists, schemata are a critical part of how knowledge is 
stored in and accessed from memory.  This process of storage and retrieval shapes new 
understanding.  In looking at the characteristics of schemata, Anderson clarifies this point 
and emphasizes the dynamic nature of schemata in saying: 
• Schemata are organized meaningfully, can be added to, and, as an individual gains 
experience, develop to include more variables and more specificity. 
• Each schema is embedded in other schemata and itself contains subschema. 
• Schemata change moment by moment as information is received. 
• They may also be reorganized when incoming data reveal a need to restructure the 
concept. 
• “The mental representations used during perception and comprehension, and which 
evolve as a result of these processes, combine to form a whole which is greater than 
the sum of its parts.” (1977, pp. 418-419) 
 
 From this list of characteristics, schemata are understood as largely individual and 
internal, shaped by experience.  While cognitive researchers and educational scholars 
underscore the importance of the individual nature of these mental structures, others 
suggest that language and culture play an inescapably important role in meaning making.   
 Sociocultural perspectives on framing.  Sociocultural perspectives are described 
as “the belief that thought has its genesis in social interaction [i.e., schemata include] 
both externally focused, interpsychological tools, such as language and other sign 
systems, and internally focused, intrapsychological tools, such as thought (McVee et al., 
2005, p. 532).”  Further schemata are “created, shaped, and sustained in social and 
cultural contexts” (McVee et al., 2005, p. 532).  This perspective suggests that schemata 
are necessarily beyond individuals given that everything is socially constructed and exists 
within the parameters of language.  
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Sociologists describe the importance of frames and effectively bridge the gap 
between schemata and frames.  Goffman (1974), for example in discussing what he calls 
primary frameworks, suggests: 
It seems that we can hardly glance at anything without applying a primary 
framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what occurred before and 
expectations of what is likely to happen now. (p. 38) 
 
This line of thinking suggests that frames may function to both organize experience and 
guide action (Benford & Snow, 2000).  Collective action frames focus on this element 
specifically, because they are not “merely aggregations of individual attitudes and 
perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning” (Gamson, 1992, p. 111).  
Benford and Snow clarify the role of schema and frames in saying: 
The implied distinction between schemas and frames can be stated more 
concretely by thinking of schemas as ‘participants’ expectations about people, 
objects, events, and settings in the world, as distinguished from alignments being 
negotiated in particular interaction,’ which is what frames do (Tannen & Wallat 
1993:60). Frames and schemas interact during the course of interaction between 
two or more individuals, with frames providing an interpretive ‘footing’ that 
aligns schemas that participants to the interaction bring with them. Thus, frames 
and schemas are not different concepts for the same phenomena but are highly 
interactive, with frames constituting a broader, interpretive answer or definition to 
‘what is going on’ or ‘what should be going on.’ (p. 614) 
 
This suggests that an important feature for sociologists, frames, usually discussed as 
merely organizing structures for cognitive scientists and educators, are a product of 
negotiated shared meaning.  Frames provide an “interpretive footing” to activate a 
participant’s own schemata. 
The idea that meaning is negotiated, and that the particular language educators 
use influences how students think about reality was borne out of a study of language in 
diverse cultures.  Lucy (1997) describes two key features of linguistic relativity that 
“language embodies an interpretation of reality, and language can influence thought 
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about that reality” (p. 294).  These features render language culturally and individually 
subjective rather than universal and objective.  Linguistic relativity is often credited to 
linguistic anthropologists Edwin Sapir and Benjamin Whorf.  According to Whorf, who 
studied Hopi, Maya, and Aztec cultures: 
Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old 
sense, but it is of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly 
between different grammars.  We dissect nature along lines laid down by our 
native languages.  The categories and types that we isolate from the world of 
phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on 
the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which 
has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic system 
in our minds.  We cut up nature, organize it into concepts, and ascribe 
significance as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize 
it in this way-an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is 
codified in the patterns of our language.   The agreement is, of course, an implicit 
and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all 
except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the 
agreement decrees. (Carroll, 1956, pp. 212-213) 
 
For Whorf, framing is not simply a matter of word selection, but rather the pattern of 
language itself that affects both how people think and how people articulate ideas.  
Further, both Whorf and Sapir subscribed to linguistic determinism, meaning that 
language and thought influence each other such that language is not a mirror of culture 
alone, but also, through reciprocal influence, a shaper of culture.  
Vygotsky, shares this perspective explaining, “the sense of a word . . . is the sum 
of all the psychological events aroused in our consciousness by the word. It is a dynamic, 
fluid, complex whole…”(1986, pp. 244-245).  In this sense, language can never be 
neutral or simple.  All language is imbued with our own psychology nested within a 
larger cultural landscape bounded by language. Said a different way, “meaning does not 
exist in the form of words or even images, but within relationships among and across 
experiences, actions, talk, people, and all sorts of culturally situated knowledge (Gee, 
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2004 as cited in McVee et al., 2005, p. 546).  This conceptualization is foundational in 
other disciplines as well. 
Media frames, for example, are described as “a central organizing idea or story 
line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106).  
Because people make sense of information in three ways, “through peer interaction, 
personal experience, and interpreted selections from the mass media” (Neuman et al., 
1992, p. 120 as cited in Scheufele, 1999), these frames play an important role in how 
people conceive of information by what schema they activate.  Similarly, for political 
science scholars, “framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular 
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007, p. 104).  Consider this example: “when asked if they would favor or 
oppose a hate group holding a political rally, 85% of the respondents answered in favor if 
the question was prefaced with the suggestion ‘Given the importance of free speech,’ 
whereas only 45% were in favor when the question was prefaced with the phrase, “Given 
the risk of violence” (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004 as cited in Chong & Druckman, 2007, 
p. 104).  The frames used in these two examples tap into entirely different personal 
metaphors (i.e., “rally as free speech” vs.  “rally as violent protest”) and their 
corresponding schemata.  This example fits well with Lakoff’s sentiment that “Framing is 
about getting words that fit your worldview, it’s not just language.  The ideas are primary 
and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas …words can draw you into 
someone else’s worldview” (Lakoff, 2004, p. 4).  Lakoff also suggests that if a strongly 




Cultural metaphor and framing. Finally, frames may operate at a more 
subconscious level than in the example described above.  Lakoff suggests that metaphor 
and analogy embedded in frames are powerful in helping us to make sense of new ideas 
and fit them into individual mental maps more readily.  As an ingrained way of thinking, 
these metaphors come to be taken literally (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  For example, the 
language used to describe “argument” effectively elicits a war metaphor: 
Claims are indefensible.   
He attacked every weak point in my argument.  
His criticisms were right on target. 
He shot down all my arguments. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 4) 
 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest that people might think and act differently if a language that 
would activate a dance metaphor was used to frame “argument.”  In this example, frames 
are operating on a more subtle, but potentially no less powerful level than those described 
by political scientists (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  Metaphorical frames seem 
particularly effective in shaping not only how one understands “argument” but also how 
one feels about it.  This happens by activating a certain set of schemata.  Because humans 
think using an “extensive, but unconscious, system of metaphorical concepts” (Lakoff, 
1995, p. 177) and language activates these metaphors, metaphors are especially powerful 
for learners and can effectively challenge existing paradigms (Gellat & Gellat, 2003; 
Wells, 2006).  
 
Metaphor in Environmental/Ecological Education 
Because ecology is often antithetical to cultural metaphors, activating alternative 
schemata may be critical in an EE context.  Ecological literacy entails “thinking broadly, 
to know something of what is hitched to what” and “is not [only] comprehension of how 
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the world works, but in light of that knowledge a life lived accordingly” (Orr, 1992, p. 
87). Yet, exploration of common misconceptions and of commonly used textbooks 
suggests that both language itself and cultural metaphor embedded in that language 
disguise relationships fundamental to ecological literacy and discourage thinking broadly 
about the role of humans in ecological systems.  
Pedagogical language and textbooks can either reinforce or challenge common 
cultural conceptions that are contrary to ecological reality and often misappropriated 
metaphor creates and reinforces ecological misconceptions (Chew & Laubichler, 2003).  
Cultural conceptions of ecology are rife with misunderstandings. The topics of these 
misconceptions, including matter cycling, energy flow, and natural selection have been 
widely studied (Armstrong, 1997; Griffiths & Grant, 1985; Hellden, 1995; Munson, 
1994; Smith & Anderson, 1986).  For example, matter cycling is narrowly understood 
among students who commonly believe that matter is created and destroyed in biological 
processes (Smith & Anderson, 1986).  Look up “matter” in Roget’s Thesaurus and you 
get “stuff, substance, and material,” a fair representation of students’ initial conceptions.  
It is important to note there is no logical distinction between “matter” and “natural 
resources.”  If people were able to create matter, people would live in a world of 
unlimited natural resources; if people were able to destroy matter, then producing 
disposable items would not be the ecological liability it is now.  Evolution and natural 
selection also provide examples of misunderstood concepts.  Two common 
misconceptions are that evolution is somehow directed and not random, and that people 
are able to individually adapt to meet needs.  Either misconception undermines reasons 
for conservation because individuals who can immediately adapt to any challenge or 
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shortage need not engage in conservation.  Similarly, students often understand natural 
selection as “the biggest and strongest survive” (Munson, 1994), an idea that fits the 
culturally normative conception that “bigger is better” despite the fact that this is not how 
natural selection works.  Survival of the fittest, perverted from Darwin’s ideas about 
natural selection, has been applied to economic systems to justify unethical and 
unsustainable economic practices and is persistently reinforced in culture (Spencer, 
1864).  It is worth considering how the frame “survival of the fit-ins” would activate 
different schemata thus facilitating a different understanding, changing the base metaphor 
from competition to cooperation (Montague, 2006). Language that shifts the emphasis 
from competition to cooperation in fact provides a more ecologically grounded 
perspective (Margulis & Sagan, 1986) and might, through activating critical elaboration, 
facilitate a more realistic understanding.  In this sense, language based on alternative 
metaphors may serve to decrease student misconceptions. 
Traditional metaphors and themes in the language of commonly used textbooks 
tends to resist ecological realities, fundamentally separating humans from the rest of 
nature, and this continued resistance is based on the metaphorical concept of humans as 
apart from nature rather than a part of nature.  For example, in the introductions of three 
of the most commonly used introductory ecology textbooks, authors use both direct 
statements and implicit metaphor to express perceptions about humans and nature.  
Begon, Townsend, and Harper (2006) state, “we try to conserve biodiversity to maintain 
ecosystem ‘services’…” and further, “our ability to control and exploit ecosystems 
cannot fail to be improved by an ability to explain and understand” (2006, p. xii).  Molles 
Jr. (2008) explains that humans are changing the environment without understanding the 
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consequences of these changes and that it is the role of ecologists to solve this problem.  
Ricklefs states “where we humans fit in a less than perfect world is a judgment that each 
of you must make, guided by your own sense of values and moral beliefs” (2007, p. 1).  
He goes on to suggest that an understanding of how systems work and the “ways in 
which humans are a part of the natural world” may inform this decision.  Metaphors 
separating humans and nature are reinforced in all of these introductions and as a 
consequence, activate different schemata.  Similarly, the initial chapter of a very popular 
environmental studies text (Miller, 1997) is an overview of humans and nature.  
Information is often attributed to “analysts” or “scientists.”  For example, “some 
analysts…contend that the world is not overpopulated…people are our most important 
resource ―both as consumers and producers …” followed by “leading scientists believe 
that we are depleting and degrading the earth’s natural capital at an accelerating rate as 
our demands on the earth’s resources and natural processes increase exponentially” (p. 
20).  The commonality among all of these texts is that, implicitly or explicitly, humans 
are depicted as apart from rather than a part of nature.  This fundamental metaphorical 
split is not only antithetical to deep ecological literacy, but also serves to make ecology 
less relevant for students.  Consider as an alternative the embedding of humans in a 
system, as explicitly dependent on the ecosystem like every other animal.  This approach 
is more in keeping with ecological literacy and including a more integrative approach 
may be critical if students are to see themselves as part of a larger system. 
The consistently expressed divide between humans and nature is indicative of the 
fundamental problem in the metaphors that consumer societies live by.  These texts, in 
keeping with traditional metaphor, perpetuate the perception of “humans as apart from 
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nature” and these metaphors play a powerful role not only in shaping the synthesis and 
interpretation of ecological information, but perhaps in motivation for students to 
critically elaborate on messages about ecology.  While students can attain an academic 
understanding that humans are included in natural systems, language and metaphor may 
inhibit students from consistently internalizing this knowledge through critical 
elaboration.  “This is significant because if we humans consider ourselves apart from 
nature, we will not necessarily consider ourselves subject to nature’s laws” (Cachelin et 
al., 2010, p. 671) and will not necessarily be motivated to consider ecological realities 
that can shape behaviors and decision-making.  
Compare this to Garrett Hardin’s approach to the articulation of ecology, “we can 
never merely do one thing” (Hardin, 1985, p. 24).  This approach necessitates a 
consideration of the consequences of all of our actions, (i.e. asking “what then)” (1985).  
This very question illustrates an understanding of the inseparable relationships in 
ecological systems and asking “what then” mandates our involvement in issues beyond 
ourselves.  Framing ecology such that students are encouraged to ask “what then?” about 
their role in a system with limited resources, governed by the laws of thermodynamics, 
lends itself more to student involvement.  As a culture, we are not encouraged to 
recognize feedback loops in ecosystems and our language practice perpetuates the idea 
that people exist outside of the rules of ecology.  When pedagogical language reinforces 
common misconceptions rather than eliciting conceptual change, and distances us from 
the subject matter, making it less relevant to our own experience educators undermine 
their goals because existing schemata, right or wrong, place powerful limits on the 
assimilation of new information (Ausubel, 1968). 
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Finally, research about framing messages to elicit PEB has been variously 
identified as altruistic or self-interested (Corbett 2005; Kaplan, 2000; Schultz & Zelezny, 
2003).  Kaplan (2000) argues that contextualizing PEB as altruistic unintentionally 
communicates that environmentalism requires personal sacrifice.  Further, he suggests 
that this approach is “far from helpful” and undermines potentially powerful linkages 
with critiques of materialism as unhealthy and unsatisfying...” (p. 495). Thus it has been 
suggested that self-interested frames in Western culture will be more effective and 
activate existing self-interest norms (Corbett 2005; Kaplan, 2000; Schultz & Zelezny, 
2003).  This research fits with the metaphor of humans as a part of nature because this 
metaphor is congruent with a self-interested rather than an altruistic approach.  
 
Voice in Environmental/Ecological Education 
Syntax may also play an important role in students’ perceptions of their 
involvement in nature.  Language used around ecological concepts contextualizes them, 
often serving to distance us from the systems people depend on for life.  Relegating 
issues to the category “environmental” separates us from them in a way that 
consideration of them from a social issues or health perspective would not.  This creates a 
perception that the environment is a special interest rather than a system upon which all 
depend and of which are a part (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005).  This 
decontextualization can impede critical thinking and dull awareness of the consequences 
of actions and feelings of responsibility by undermining the relevance and involvement 
necessary for critical elaboration.   
Abstract concepts are often explored using passive voice as opposed to the more 
empowering active voice.  Concepts like habitat loss, biodiversity, population 
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growth, over-consumption, and introduced species are central to the current study of 
ecology and are all complex concepts.  Confusingly, many texts use these concepts 
as either the passive subject or the object of the sentence, meaning that there is no 
concrete actor. For example, consider the text that follows:  
Bengal tigers once roamed widely across India and Southeast Asia.  Now they're 
in trouble because of habitat loss and people killing them illegally for their 
bones, which are used to make traditional Asian medicines.  (Braus, 1994, p. 7, 
as cited in Chenhansa & Schleppegrell, 1998) 
 
Two causes of population decline are identified in the text above, yet, 90% of middle 
school students understood this to mean that people killing the tiger was the major cause 
of decline (Chenhansa & Schleppegrell, 1998).  It is not only the complexity of the 
concepts, but also the use of passive voice that students find confusing, and it is logical to 
assume that passive voice and content both play a role in how new information is 
integrated into existing schemata.   
Passive voice is often used in the presentation of research, which can also impact 
how humans see themselves in ecological terms.  For example:  
Some Soviet scientists researching the Bering Sea call American scientists “anti-
ecologistic” because of American emphasis on studying single species…We see 
everything in terms of connections. 
…Scientists wonder what is happening to seals, sea lions, and birds.  … we watch 
sea lions eating seal pups with greater frequency than ever in memory…chicks on 
bird cliffs dropping to the rocks below because they are too weak…seal pelts are 
thinner than ever in memory…mature bull seals are smaller than just ten years 
ago.  This tells us that all these species are having food problems…Every coastal 
village where there is strong dependency on the sea for a livelihood and a way of 
life have their own observations. (Knudtson & Suzuki as cited in Smith & 
Williams, 1999, pp. 120-121) 
 
The text of the Aleutian observer is first person active voice.  From both language content 
and his chosen voice, he is an active member of the community. This element may in fact 
be key to perceived involvement and relevance.  
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Intentional framing, which includes both the obvious use of metaphor and active 
voice, is particularly important in an environmental education context for several reasons.  
First, ecological concepts are often antithetical to commonly used cultural metaphor, 
leading to a variety of misconceptions.  Second, common cultural metaphors that activate 
a schema of humans as apart from nature, rather than a part of nature, will most likely 
decrease both involvement and relevance such that elaboration is less likely to occur.  
Third, traditional frames do not create dissonance, which according to the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model, can provide motivation to elaborate.  Finally, the use of passive voice, 
and the perception of nature as object rather than subject, may decrease ecological 
understandings as well as student involvement and relevance.  Because the distal goal of 
EE is pro-environmental behavior, and both attitude and understanding play important 
roles in fostering such behavior, using frames with active voice that include humans as a 
part of the natural system may be significant. 
The difficult, if hopeful, work lies ahead in crafting and implementing frames 
based on new metaphors.  Teaching for ecological literacy is demanding to be sure, and 
inevitably leads to uncomfortable self-examination.  Orr (1992) notes: 
…to see things in their wholeness is politically threatening.  To understand that 
our manner of living… is linked to cancer rates in migrant laborers in California, 
disappearance of tropical rainforests, 50,000 toxic dumps across the U.S.A., and 
the depletion of the ozone layer is to see the need for a change in our way of life. 
(p. 88) 
 
This type of dissonance may be precisely the approach needed to increase student 








The purpose of this study was to consider the impacts of intentional framing on 
critical elaboration.  Environmental education models suggest that interventions seeking 
to impact both understanding and attitude are crucial.  To this end, critical elaboration, a 
synthesis of critical thinking from the education literature, and elaboration, an attitude-
related construct from the persuasion literature, is an important contribution to the field of 
sustainability education.  According to the elaboration likelihood model, involvement and 
dissonance foster critical elaboration.  Similarly, according to critical thinking research, 
critical thought is more likely to occur when information provided is relevant to students.  
Yet, traditional teaching often uses frames that discourage involvement, relevance, and 
dissonance and as such decrease the likelihood that critical elaboration will occur.  
Alternative frames that manipulate underlying metaphor and voice may be able to change 
this pattern and activate different schemata that could increase critical elaboration.  To 
test these ideas, frames were developed and tested.   
Active systems frames (ASF) may clarify existing misconceptions that occur due 
to language use, and counter the variety of cultural messages that initially undermine 
message elaboration and ultimately undermine PEB.  For the purposes of this research, an 
ASF was defined as one that takes a systems-approach to the environment — using the 
base metaphor that humans are a part of rather than apart from ecosystems, and uses 
active rather than passive voice.  For example, teaching students that “we are all solar-
powered,” a notion which encompasses these criteria, may be more meaningful and drive 
home a more personal conceptualization of the realities of energy flow than discussing 
the laws of thermodynamics.  Similarly, teaching students that there is no “away” to 
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which to throw things, by reinforcing that people are part of a system in which they drive 
waste materials to a landfill, may provide the much needed impetus for message 
elaboration that might ultimately result in conservation.  With language being constitutive 
of reality, as much as reflective of it, ASFs may provide a deeper and more lasting critical 
understanding of ecology while also attending to issues of attitude, personal and social 
norms, and perceived behavioral control.  Therefore, this study included three 
hypotheses: 
H1: There will be a significant interaction between metaphor type and voice. The 
interaction will be such that the effect of voice on critical elaboration will depend 
on the metaphor being used. Active voice and the integration (a part of nature) 
frame will yield the highest critical elaboration scores. 
Should the interaction be nonsignificant, main effect hypotheses will be tested. 
H2: Critical elaboration scores will be higher for active voice than for passive 
voice. 









The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of framing in the context of 
environmental education.  This chapter describes the methods employed to investigate 
this purpose. The organization of the chapter includes seven main sections: 1) setting, 2) 
participants, 3) research design, 4) measurement, 5) procedures, 6) data analysis, and 7) 




Data collection took place on the University of Utah campus in an introductory 
level Parks, Recreation, and Tourism (PRT) course and on the Utah State University 
campus in an introductory level ecology course. Between 75 and 100 students were 
registered for the courses from which research participants were drawn.  Data were 
collected during a regular classroom meeting; in one class, this happened at the beginning 
of the session, in the other, at the end.  Both of these classes took place midmorning.  
While classes maintained the atmosphere of an exam, there were some distractions for 
students.  For example, in one class, students had computers out and were circulating a 






The sample consisted of 70 introductory Parks, Recreation, and Tourism students 
from the University of Utah and 68 ecology students from Utah State University.  The 
collective sample of participants represented a variety of academic majors including 
many who had not yet declared a major.  Students from these courses were appropriate 
for this study for several reasons.  Introductory courses typically offer a diversity of 
students and a large sample size.  Introductory courses likely mean that students have not 
yet been exposed to a lot of university-level coursework in this area.  Petty and Cacioppi 
(1986) report that little prior knowledge of an issue means that participants need to rely 
on the information in the provided text.  As such, a class with students who are less 
familiar with ecological concepts may yield responses based solely on the stimulus.  All 




Critical elaboration was measured using an adapted thought-listing technique 
(Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968 as cited in Petty & Cacioppi, 1981).  This approach 
emphasizes “how people personally evaluate the information provided…and ultimately it 
is the person’s own self-statements that produce change or resistance” (Petty & Cacioppi, 
1981, p. 310).  This measure, usually used in studying the impact of a persuasive message 
on attitude, provides a format through which participants can respond to messages.  
Given text, instructions (see Appendix A), and typically 2-3 minutes to list thoughts, 
participants simply read text and record their thoughts in written statements.  Response 




by the text.  Times have ranged between 2 and 45 minutes and the general rule of thumb 
is “if only the most salient thoughts are desired, then a brief interval would be better than 
a long one.  If the interval is too long, a subject would have time to reflect on, generate 
additions to, select among, and delete portions of his or her cognitive responses” (Petty & 
Cacioppi, 1981, p. 316).  Because this study measured critical thinking as an element of 
critical elaboration, and due to the length of the text, the time was expanded 15 minutes. 
 
Coding for Critical Elaboration 
In previous thought-listing studies, researchers coded participant statements along 
predetermined dimensions including polarity, target, origin, or reality.  For example, the 
polarity dimension would include an assessment of whether the statement reflects a 
positive, neutral, or negative attitude toward the attitude object.  In this study, rather than 
coding for positive or negative statements toward and attitude object, statements were 
coded as to whether or not they exhibited critical thinking. Critical thinking was defined 
by the presence or absence of four indicators (identifying/questioning unstated 
assumptions; looking for alternatives/suggesting an action; seeking clarification and/or 
challenge; and deriving an overall evaluation of, or attitude toward, the issue being 
presented).  Any one of these indicators meant that the listed thought was an example of 
critical elaboration as described in the coding definitions (see Appendix B).  These 
definitions were the basis of the codebook. 
The purpose of developing the codebook was to produce a document that would 
enable coders for this study to systematically identify examples of critical elaboration 
from a list of thoughts.  In addition, the codebook would enable future researchers to 




literature on critical thinking and elaboration and then decision rules and operational 
definitions were created for each element. 
Development of the codebook was a lengthy process consisting of several phases.  
Throughout the summer of 2010, two student codebook developers and the researcher 
worked through pilot data to refine definitions, the data collection form, and protocols.  
Although scoring for critical elaboration was based on meeting only one of the four 
defined elements (identifying unstated assumptions, seeking clarification, presenting 
alternatives, or expressing an attitude) data were coded for the specific element to ensure 
clear and useful definitions.  Developers initially worked from broad definitions with 
several criteria and refined both definitions and decision rules until at least two people 
agreed on codes more than 90% of the time.  Examples of some of the issues that arose 
were: 
• What constitutes a thought? 
• How do we code emotion-based statements? 
• If a statement is related to one’s self, does that count as critical 
elaboration? 
 Questions	  such	  as	  these	  were	  discussed	  until	  consensus	  was	  reached	  and	  then	  the	  coding	  protocols	  and	  definitions	  were	  refined	  to	  reflect	  this	  understanding. 
When the codebook was used for the second set of pilot data, coders were in 
agreement slightly less than 50% of the time.  This brought us to our next revision of the 
codebook where coders clarified the difference between feelings and thoughts and 
discussed the use of the data boxes.  Infrequently, research participants ignored the boxes 
and wrote paragraphs that went on for several boxes.  Coders determined that a paragraph 
would only be counted as one thought.  The researcher and coders discussed changing the 




example of listing one thought per box, even with multiple sentences.  Coders also 
discussed the virtue of continuing to code by subcategory rather than just 
presence/absence of critical elaboration in order to be forced to identify why each thought 
was or was not an example of critical elaboration.  Importantly, it was suggested by one 
of the coders that we ought to code one frame type in its entirety given that the different 
frames had different assumptions.  This necessitated a hard look at all the frames as well 
as a discussion of different assumptions underlying each frame type.  In looking at the 
frames themselves, the researcher noted that in two of the frames, many assumptions 
could be identified whereas in the other two frames, parallel ideas were not assumptions 
at all, but clearly stated.  This necessitated a fine-tuning of the existing frames.  As such, 
it was decided that the data collected to date should be pilot data and that new samples 
should be collected.  After this revision, interrater reliability between the coders was 
calculated at 85.4% regarding the presence or absence of critical elaboration.  Areas of 




In this 2 x 2, between groups, fully-crossed, factorial design (see Table 2), student 
participants were randomly assigned to read one of four different types of frames.  Frame 




During a classroom meeting, four frames were systematically distributed to 
students.  They were given 15 minutes to list their thoughts according to the thought-





Fully-crossed Factorial Research Design 
Frames Metaphor Type 
Humans apart from nature 
Active Voice (ANSF) 
Humans a part of nature 
Active Voice (ASF) 
Voice 
Humans apart from nature 
Passive Voice (PNSF) 
Humans a part of nature 
Passive Voice (PSF) 
 
 
in the front of the classroom.  This procedure was piloted three times in order to ensure  
that directions were appropriate for this setting.  Data were then collected. 
 
Manipulation Check 
At the bottom of the thought-listing form, participants were asked to respond to 
three prompts utilizing a 7-point semantic differential scale.  The prompt root said “the 
text I just read portrayed humans as” followed by the anchor points: 1) impacting nature, 
not impacting nature, 2) connected to nature or disconnected from nature, and 3) a part of 
natural systems, apart from natural systems.  The third item (a part of natural systems – 
apart from natural systems) was used as the manipulation check. It was hypothesized that 
mean scores would be lower for those who read the “humans as a part of nature” frame 
than those who read the “humans as apart from nature” frame. Lower mean scores would 
indicate that respondents were judging their frame as toward the “apart of nature” end of 
the semantic differential item.  An independent samples t-test showed that those who read 




the “humans as apart from nature” frame. This provided evidence that the frame 
manipulation was successful (see Table 3). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Data were cleaned and entered into SPSS.  Data were screened for outliers and 
tests for normality and equality of variances were performed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test for normality was significant (D (137) 0.157, p <. 001) indicating some departure 
from normality. However, analysis of Q-plots failed to show serious departures from 
normality. Data transformations were attempted and analysis of Q-plots suggested that 
such transformations failed to improve distributional shape.  Thus, data analyses were 
performed on the raw scores. One case was eliminated as a univariate outlier as its z 
score was 3.1 standard deviations away from the mean.  Levene’s test for equality of 
error variances was not significant at the p<.05 level, F (133,3) = .921, p = .432.  





Metaphor Type n Mean Standard Error 
Systems 62 4.59 .25 
Nonsystems 69 5.60 .24 







Potential Threats to Valid Inferences 
Within any study there is a likelihood that the inferences drawn result from a  
cause or causes other than the variable or variables studied.  The following tables (Tables 
4-6) present the threats to making valid inferences, specifically by examining potential 
threats to internal validity, potential threats to external validity, and potential threats to 
statistical conclusions and providing information as to how these threats were controlled 







Threats to Internal Validity  
Threat Controlled Explanation 
History Yes History was consistent across all groups. 
Maturation Yes 
Due to the short duration of the experiment, 
maturation did not occur. 
Testing Yes Each measurement tool was used only once. 
Instrumentation No 





Focus was on group differences (Frame Type). Also, 
there was no pretest and participants were randomly 
assigned to treatments. 
Selection bias Yes 
Participants were randomly assigned to experimental 
groups. 
Attrition Yes 
Due to the short duration of the experiment, there 










Threats to External Validity 
Threat Controlled Explanation 
Generality across subjects Partially Group differences were assessed.  
Generality across settings Yes Settings were the same.  
Generality across response Unknown Unknown 
Generality across time Yes Participation in the study occurred just 
once. 
Generality across behavior 
change agents 
Yes 




Text use not uncommon. 
Reactive assessment Yes No assessment /performance evaluation 
Pretest sensitization Yes No pretest was administered. 
Multiple-treatment 
interference 






Threats to Statistical Conclusions 
Threat Controlled Explanation 
Low statistical power Yes Large sample was available for pilot 
test. 
Violation of assumptions Yes Statistical assumptions were assessed. 
Unreliability of measures Yes Coders were trained and intercoder 
reliability was assessed. 
Consistency of treatment 
implementation 
Yes Subjects were randomly assigned in 
each implementation and group 
differences were assessed. 
Random irrelevancies in the 
experimental setting 
Yes Subjects were randomly assigned in 
each setting and group differences were 
assessed. 
Random heterogeneity of 
subjects  
Partially 













The purpose of this study was to test the effects of two frame types on critical 
elaboration in the context of sustainability education.  This chapter details the analysis 
course and reports results for data collected from participating college students in 
introductory level courses.  Descriptive information about the participants and hypothesis 




The study included 138 participants.  Seventy of these participants were students 
enrolled in an introductory course in the Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism at 
the University of Utah.  Sixty-eight of the participants were enrolled in an introductory 
course in the Department of Wildland Science at Utah State University.  Each participant 
responded to three paragraphs of text (treatments) about the ecological concept of 
carrying capacity.  The information in these paragraphs was a unique combination of 
metaphor type (‘A Part of’ or systems metaphor, and ‘Apart From’ or nonsystems 
metaphor) and voice (‘Active’ or ‘Passive’ language).  Treatments were systematically 
assigned to students in each class, such that students responded either to an active 
systems frame, a passive systems frame, an active nonsystems frame, or a passive non-





yielded 603 thoughts across all four frame types.  Critical thinking did not vary by class (t 
= 1.42, p = .15) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The overall mean critical elaboration and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 




In interpreting between subject effects, contrary to H1, there was no significant 
interaction between voice and metaphor type (see Table 8).  Comparison of main effect 
means, however, revealed significant differences between them at a p <. 05 (see Table 8), 
supporting H2 and H3.  Critical elaboration scores were higher when systems metaphor 
frames were used than when nonsystems metaphor frames were used, and critical 
elaboration scores were also higher when active voice was used as compared to passive 

















Descriptive Statistics for Critical Elaboration Scores 
n Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
























Two-factor Analysis of Variance Results: Effects Of Two Language Frames Of Interest, 
Metaphor Type (2 Levels: ’A Part Of’ And ‘Apart From’) and Voice (2 Levels: ‘Active’ 
Or ‘Passive’). 
Frame 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Metaphor Type 15.322 1 15.322 5.723 .018 .041 
Voice 14.004 1 14.004 5.231 .024 .038 
MT * Voice 2.539 1 2.539 .948 .332 .007 




Mean and Standard Error of Critical Elaboration Scores for Voice and Metaphor Type 
Voice Metaphor Mean Std. Error 
Nonsystems 1.486 .277 Passive 
Systems 1.882 .281 
Nonsystems 1.853 .281 Active 
















The purpose of this study was to test the impact of different frame types on 
critical elaboration.  Critical elaboration was measured in a 2 x 2 factorial design using 
frames employing either active or passive voice and based in a metaphor that depicted 
humans as either a part of or apart from nature.  Results support the hypotheses that 
active voice yields more critical elaboration than passive voice, as do frames that cast 
humans as a part of nature.  This chapter includes an overview of the study, a summary of 
results, an integration of the results with previous research, study limitations, and 




Many scholars believe language is not reflective of the world but rather that 
language defines and shapes it (Carroll, 1956; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  Intentional 
language choices are essential in educational contexts because while language conveys 
surface meaning, it also broadcasts a deeper worldview.  This “unspoken” element 
inherent in every communication is of fundamental interest to educators because of its 
inherent power.  Students make sense of new information by fitting it in with what they 
already understand (Ausubel, 1968), and language activates underlying metaphors 





Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999) around which understandings and attitudes are 
based.  Both framing and schema theory provided the foundation for this study, 
suggesting that language can be a powerful tool in creating a worldview that is based in 
sustainability. 
Many models have been created that attempt to explain the path to sustainable or 
pro-environmental behaviors (Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Borden & Schettino, 1979; 
Hines et al., 1986; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Sia et al., 1986; Volk & McBeth, 1998).  
Common among them is both knowledge and attitude, yet these elements have not been 
assessed together in a common research framework.  Thus, it became important to test 
both of these variables in a synthesizing context. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) assert that 
elaboration is the path to forming strong attitudes.  Furthermore, critical thinking is 
recognized as an important step in understanding and evaluating information (Halpern, 
1996). While elaboration and critical thinking are not the same thing, they have many 
similar attributes, making their synthesis valuable and logical in the context of 
sustainability education.  Use of the thought-listing technique (Cacioppo, Von Hippel, & 
Ernst, 1997) allowed for open-ended and quantifiable measurement to assess the effects 
of different frames on these recognized antecedents of pro-environmental behavior. 
Because common cultural metaphors are often antithetical to ecological reality 
and consequently pro-environmental behavior (Cachelin et al., 2010) it was necessary to 
challenge these metaphors when constructing frames.  A review of introductory 
ecological textbooks provided insight into pervasiveness of language that resists the 
limited nature of matter, and in searching for an underlying metaphor or schema, it 





apart from natural systems rather than a part of them.  Creating alternative frames 
required considering language that reinforces the “humans apart” metaphor and 
manipulating it.  Words like “resources” and “habitat” connote difference where “food,” 
“materials,” and “home” connote sameness. The use of first person words, such as “I” 
and “we” evoke different meaning and feelings than third person words, such as 
“researchers” and “they.” Finally, communicating ecological phenomena in an 
educational setting using examples that explicitly impact human populations rather than 
those that impact only nonhuman populations calls on readers to acknowledge that 
humans are a part of a larger system.  Applying these subtle but fundamentally different 
frames to text was foundational to the design of this study.  
Because passive voice has been recognized as problematic in the presentation of 
ecological information (Schellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005; Chehansa & Schleppegrell, 
1998), frames were also designed to manipulate voice.  Frames utilizing both metaphor 
types were created in active and passive voice.  The following section discusses the 
results of this manipulation. 
Summary of Results  
 
The results of the study fully supported the hypotheses that frame type and voice 
can and do affect critical elaboration.  The direction and significance of main effects were 
congruent with predictions.  The systems metaphor frame (humans as “a part of” nature) 
elicited significantly more critical elaboration than the nonsystems metaphor, as 
hypothesized.  Also as hypothesized, active voice elicited more critical elaboration than 







Integration with Previous Research 
 
This research supports the work of previous researchers in elaboration and critical 
thinking.  Cognitive scientists Lakoff and Anderson (1980) and anthropologists Whorf 
and Sapir (see Carroll, 1956) discuss the idea that words matter, language patterns matter, 
and frames matter.  They are proponents of the notion that language shapes rather than 
reflects reality, and while this research does not directly test that hypothesis, it allows us 
to see how thoughts change in response to different “languaging” of the same ideas. 
Johnson and Eagly (1989) suggested that messages that are relevant and involving 
tend to foster elaboration.  Both metaphor type and voice are manipulations of the 
involvement concept.  Framing humans as a part of nature involves humans in a systems 
context such that nature is something in which all humans are involved.  This may be one 
reason why that frame elicited more elaboration.  Manipulation of voice from passive to 
active, and from “they” to “we” might also affect involvement.  In light of the 
involvement research (Johnson & Eagly, 1989), it is particularly interesting to note that 
the effect size was larger for metaphor type than for voice.  This is congruent with 
expectations given that manipulation of voice is a much more subtle change than 
manipulating a baseline metaphor and implying a different worldview. 
Previous research about critical thinking is also germane to these results.  It is 
often recognized as a combination of disposition and ability, rather than something that 
can be activated (Ennis, 1985; McCarthy, 1992).  This study’s data largely support those 
who consider critical thinking as episodic given that some conditions elicited more 
critical thinking than others.  If critical thinking were a disposition, mean critical 





would attend to different dispositions.  Yet, the positive skew of the distribution of 
critical elaboration scores overall may imply that some do not engage in critical thinking 
under any condition.  In this sense, there is also support for the idea that critical thinking 
is dispositional in nature or that some just do not possess the ability or disposition to 
think critically.  There is also the possibility that for some participants, the text itself was 
not compelling enough to activate critical thinking.  This interpretation is in keeping with 
the literature that describes cognitive efficiency as mandating mental breaks, times when 
people do not engage in critical thinking and act as cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). 
Critical thinking is also impacted by cognitive dissonance. Literature on 
dissonance suggests that there is an acceptable threshold (Festinger, 1957) beyond which 
critical thought will not occur.  In looking at frames commonly used in ecology 
education, researchers (Cachelin et al., 2010; Chenhansa & Schleppegrell, 1998; 
Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005) noted more frequent use of passive voice and frames 
that cast humans as apart from nature.  Manipulating these variables intentionally to 
create dissonance could conceivably have reduced critical elaboration, and muddied or 
even inverted the results.  Perhaps because of the subtlety of the frame differences in this 
study, cognitive dissonance was not great enough to block critical elaboration. 
In these ways, data are largely in keeping with existing research from both the 
persuasion and education literatures.  Involvement and relevance of messaging may have 
played a significant role in elaboration; level of dissonance may have been subtle enough 










While this study provided interesting insights into framing and critical 
elaboration, there were several limitations.  These include logistical issues such as sample 
size limits and limits to the sphere of inference due to the diversity of the participant pool 
and to the single-topic focus.  Some of the elements the frames themselves may have also 
been a limitation.  While every attempt was made to see that frames differed only by 
voice and metaphor type, the consequent word selections may have had more of an 
impact than was initially recognized. 
The sample was largely one of convenience, comprised of 138 participants in two 
classes (a required ecology course for non-ecology majors at Utah State University, and a 
required Parks, Recreation and Tourism course at the University of Utah). Participants in 
introductory classes were selected intentionally because the most effective use of a 
thought-listing technique (Cacioppo et al., 1997) is with populations who are not steeped 
in knowledge regarding the concept being discussed. Depth of relevant knowledge 
increases the likelihood participants will respond to the message itself rather than their 
own background knowledge.  While these criteria were met by using classes that were 
not for ecology majors, these classes may have been positively predisposed to nature such 
that the systems frames used may have avoided crossing the threshold into a condition so 
dissonant that critical thinking was blocked (Festinger, 1957).  The results, while 






The use of only one topic, in this case, carrying capacity, also limits the ability to 
infer that the same metaphor manipulations would be effective across all ecological 
topics.  Creating frames that were equal in information given depth of treatment and 
number of assumptions was very challenging.  Given this and the sample size, it made the 
most sense to create and test frames about only one topic, though the creation and testing 
of frames in other topics would expand the inferential sphere.   
Because frames were constructed to manipulate the underlying metaphor of 
humans as a part of or apart from nature, the language differed.  For example, the frame 
that depicted humans as apart from nature used the example of a botanist from the 11th 
century, whereas the frame that depicted humans as a part of nature used a more 
contemporary scientist, Thomas Malthus, whose work focused on human populations.  
While this selection was intentional, the time periods were so different that this may have 
been a source of variance.  Additionally, examples of carrying capacity were very 
different.  The frame that emphasized humans as apart from nature used Guam as an 
example of a diminished capacity for native plant species, while that frame that 
emphasized humans as a part of nature used Easter Island as an example of diminished 
capacity for humans.  While these examples were intentional, it is possible that they 
introduced variance beyond the intended metaphorical manipulation.  For example, the 
Easter Island example mentions cannibalism and many of the responses name that 
explicitly.  Similarly, in the Guam example, snakes are mentioned and some participants 
expressed a visceral response.   In manipulations of voice, differences existed.  For 





frame does.  While none of the responses explicitly speak to Malthus, it is possible that 
this difference impacted responses. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
This study provides an interesting and important step towards understanding how 
framing can impact critical elaboration.  Many valuable research questions follow from 
this work including the following: Is critical elaboration an important variable to measure 
the impact of environmental/sustainability education programs more broadly?  Will 
manipulation of underlying metaphors elicit differences in critical elaboration when 
applied to different topics with a broader diversity of participants?  Can alternative 
frames play a role in reducing misconceptions in ecology?  Will a qualitative analysis of 
the thoughts listed show different response patterns between frame types and voice?  All 
of these questions can serve to build on the current understanding of manipulating frames 
for increased understanding. 
While the construct of critical elaboration was created for this study, it may play 
an important role in sustainability education programs evaluation more generally.  A 
common critique of environmental education programs and their evaluation is the lack of 
information related to attitudes and to affective variables (Cachelin, Paisley, & 
Blanchard, 2009; Chawla, 2007).  Critical elaboration as a more common program 
outcome and thought-listing as a more common measurement technique may attend to 
these issues.  The thought-listing technique allows researchers to measure understanding 
through an examination of critical thinking attributes at the same time as they consider 
attitudes.  Interpreting this same data through a qualitative lens may shed light on 





elaboration and thought-listing may be very useful in programs that have pro-
environmental behaviors as their goal.  
In addition, there are several ways that the thought-listing technique might be 
used in sustainability education.  For example, there are so many well-documented 
misconceptions in ecology, thoughts listed could be analyzed in terms of the presence or 
absence of misconceptions under each frame type.  In addition, looking at the listed 
thoughts qualitatively may give insight into how framing impacts variables other than 
critical thinking.  Many of these variables may be important antecedents of pro-
environmental behavior. 
To extend the generalizability of the study, future research might include working 
with a different and larger sample, for example, one that includes business majors, 
English majors, and engineering majors who are less likely to be positively predisposed 
to nature.  Also, the practice of changing the underlying metaphor needs to be applied to 
other topics and issues in ecology.  In this experiment, carrying capacity is discussed and 
while it may be inferred that this technique will have impact when applied to other topics,  
it would be valuable to see this technique applied to topics like climate chaos, 
biodiversity, energy flow, or matter cycling.   
Finally, if results of this study hold across larger and different samples with 
different topics, it would be valuable to see if framing can impact other elements of the 
model proposed in the literature review.  For example, does framing have the potential to 
impact norms or perceived behavioral control?  While the results of this study and the 





environmental behavior models, studying what this variable contributes to individual 
model elements may be useful and important.  
 
Implications for Practice 
Currently, sustainability education is at best overlooking valuable tools and at 
worst undermining itself altogether.  It is incumbent on sustainability educators to select 
frames intentionally, see that these frames are consistent with ecological realities, and 
acknowledge that there is no absolute neutrality in the presentation of information. 
Wendell Berry notes if we are to rectify our relationships with each other and the 
environment, we must first rectify our language (Bowers, 2001). Appreciating the power 
of language and metaphor is key to achieving this goal.  While this challenge seems 
straightforward, in practice, it is very difficult.  Ultimately, this practice would ask 
educators to critically consider the metaphors tapped by common frames as well as voice. 
Ehrenfeld (2003) speaks to this idea: 
. . . learning, innovation, paradigm change, thinking out of the box, and so on, 
take place, first, by grabbing onto a metaphor that dissolves the problems that 
have stymied action. Then, if the actor is comfortable in the metaphor, she or he 
begins to look for rules that allow analysis, design, and practical action. (p. 2) 
 
Beyond metaphor, alternative frames also call on educators to deeply consider what 
distinctions exist between education and advocacy.  
By definition, environmental education is distinct from advocacy.  An oft-quoted 
idea is that environmental education teaches you how to think not what to think.  The 
North American Guidelines for Excellence in Environmental Education state: 
An educational curriculum must present different viewpoints, such as the pros and 
cons of forest fires. Different perspectives also need to be presented in a balanced 
way—one that does not bias the student toward any one perspective. (NAAEE, 






And while people often consider environmental education the province of K-12 
educators, the sentiment is certainly relevant to higher education as well.  Consider the 
following from Goodstein (2009) at Bard College, “Advocacy runs counter to education 
when understanding is sacrificed to political expediency. And yet, from fear of being 
falsely characterized as advocates, educators cannot now shy away from the implications 
of global warming science.”  These quotes make us aware of the difficulty educators face 
in navigating ecological issues, especially those that are social in origin.  Data from this 
research speak directly to this issue in fundamental ways. 
Because these data suggest that even a subtle shift in language yields different 
results, they support the idea that there is no neutrality in the presentation of information.  
Cultural moorings are revealed through frames.  The idea that there is no neutrality is 
inherent in the design of the study itself.  In a field tiptoeing around education vs. 
advocacy, a dependent variable with its foundation in the persuasion literature is certain 
to raise a red flag.  Yet, how can sustainability educators avoid the persuasion literature 
when attitude is a factor in every sustainable behavior model?  Perhaps the only way to 
do this is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that neutrality exists.   
A more common approach to the tension between education and advocacy is to 
rely upon science, specifically reductionist empiricism.  If students can see, touch, 
experience something, then it must be real and unbiased.  If people can look closely at 
pieces then they can make inference to wholes.  Science is celebrated for its objectivity 
and scientific writing traditionally demands excising all first person language, relying on 
passive voice, and removing researchers from their studies.  Yet data from this study 





1999) or Sale who point out the value of subjective knowledge in terms of sustainability.  
Sale describes organic science as: 
a cumulative body of knowledge acquired over generations of direct experience 
and hypothesis testing within a bioregion—knowledge that often makes the 
difference between an adequate diet and starvation.  Because of its 
intergenerational nature, organic science is interwoven with a cultural groups’ 
understanding of interdependent relationships —which makes it part of the 
groups’ moral code. (p. 42) 
 
In contrast with organic science, empirical reductionist science secures its power and 
control over nature by claiming objectivity. In doing so it may replace culturally and 
geographically specific and relevant information with less useful information in the 
context of sustainability. According to Sale, this is no accident: 
Self-sufficiency, mutual aid, morality in the marketplace, stubborn tradition, 
regulation by custom, organic knowledge instead of mechanistic science—had to 
be steadily and systematically disrupted and displaced.  All the practices that kept 
the individual from being a consumer had to be done away with so that the cogs 
and wheels of an unfettered machine called “the economy” could operate without 
interference. (p. 42) 
 
Sale situates current thinking in the persuasive campaign of those who benefit from 
consumer culture.  As science and technology are honored by society as the path to 
progress and an ethical world, it is also important to recognize the processes and products 
of science as threatening, and as a rationalization that maintains the status quo.  Organic 
science reaches beyond more traditional science in that it bridges the gap between science 
and ethics and this approach to science may be a more honest science in the pursuit of 
sustainability.   
While cultural narratives are based in a paradigm that suggests that earth equals 
resource, and that resources are unlimited, these data suggest that normalizing an 
alternative ecologically consistent articulation may have real value in education, 





the offense with your values and principles, repeating them over and over and over” (p. 
31).  Framing can be a powerful tool for sustainability and educators need to go on the 
offensive in terms of framing messages in keeping with a worldview that honors 























INSTRUCTIONS FOR THOUGHT-LISTING TECHNIQUE 
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I am about to distribute a sheet of paper that has three paragraphs of text on one 
side and a place for you to list your thoughts on the other.  I would like you first to read 
the paragraphs on the front side of the paper; take your time and read them carefully.  
When you are finished reading, please turn your sheet over and list your thoughts, one 
per box, on the sheet.  On the screen, you will see what the boxes look like and you will 
notice in my example that you may put more than one line in a box as long as it is just 
one thought.  You will also notice that there are three questions at the bottom of the text; 
please respond to these after you list your thoughts.  Does anyone have any questions?  
There is no need to put your name on these papers.  This exercise is in no way related to 

























Please record any thoughts you have regarding the passage you have just read.  Please put 
only one thought in each box. You do not need to fill each box. 
This is an example of listing one thought in each box, though this thought may take more 






























Please circle one: 
This text I just read illustrates humans as: 
 
Impacting nature         3       2       1       0       1       2       3          Not impacting nature 
 
Connected to nature       3       2       1       0       1       2       3       Disconnected from nature 
 

























CRITICAL EVALUATION CODEBOOK 
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 The coding procedures and decision rules described in this manual are intended 
for the use of performing analysis of thoughts listed by students after exposure to 
intentionally framed ecology text for the purpose of understanding critical elaboration 
and its relation with associated variables. This analysis method retains some of the 
richness of student responses while allowing for quantification of variables.  This method 
will allow for statistical analysis and hypothesis testing.   
Data will be quantified through coding for the presence and absence of elements 
of critical elaboration.  Critical elaboration, a construct developed from the concept of 
elaboration in the persuasion literature and critical thinking in the education literature, is 
defined as careful consideration of an issue characterized by thoughtful critique.  
Thinking skills utilized in critical elaboration include identifying and questioning 
unstated assumptions, suggesting alternatives, seeking clarification and/or challenge, and 




Data coding for critical elaboration 
 Instructions: 
You will be given a sheet of paper.  On one side, you will have text that students were 
given to read.  Familiarize yourself with this text.  The other side has several boxes with 
student writing in them.  There is one thought listed in each box.  Code each thought 
separately as follows: 
Code all the data for each frame separately.  Carefully read each frame before you code 
for that frame and try to get the gestalt of the thought. 
Decision-making protocols: 
1. There must be one thought in the box.  If the student has written a paragraph 
rather than listed thoughts, the maximum score the whole paragraph can 
receive is a 1.  
 
2. Similarly some sentences express more than one thought; for example, “We 
should either use less or expect to die out.” the maximum score this sentence 
can receive is a 1. 
 
3. There must be an actual thought recorded – a one-word response, or a few 
words with no verb does not constitute a thought (unless it is the command 
form and the noun is implied).  If there is no verb in any tense present, score 
the box as a 0 and move on to the next thought. 
 
4. A thought is distinct from an emotion.  Here we are only interested in 
thoughts.  If the sentence or fragment expresses only an emotion, e.g., “it 
makes me feel sad,” score the box as a 0 and move on to the next thought. 
Sometimes people precede thoughts with the word “feel”; for example: “I feel 
this is a big problem.”  Reading beyond the language to get at the gestalt is a 
critical part of coding.  To determine whether something is actually an 
emotion, try replacing the word “understand” or “believe” - e.g., “I believe 
this is a big problem” – as opposed to “I believe sad.”  The second sentence 
doesn’t work because it really is an emotion rather than a belief. 
 
5. Decide whether the thought that has been listed is related to the topic of the 
text – i.e., carrying capacity.  (Sometimes thoughts are about the manner of 
presentation rather than the topic itself.)  If the thought is topic-relevant, then 




6. Decide if the comment is summative in nature, or if it is more than that.  If the 
comment is merely a summation, with no overall position taken or evaluation 




Critical elaboration subcategories and coding criteria: 
 
Determine if each thought (individually) meets any of the criteria below. Note that each 
thought can be given only one point, so as soon as you have identified it as an example of 
one of the subheadings below, score it as a 1 and begin the process again with the next 
thought.  There is no need to track which of the following subcategories of critical 
elaboration each thought falls under.   
 
Identifying / Questioning Unstated Assumptions 
Any text includes assumptions.  An assumption is an unstated premise, or 
something that is being taken for granted. In the text that research participants read, 
for example, there are assumptions about the relationship between humans and 
nature, i.e., their role as managers vs. members, and probably many others.  If 
participants describe or question assumptions, score the thought as a 1; if not, 
continue. 
 
Looking for Alternatives / Suggesting an Action 
Participants may suggest alternatives to some scenarios mentioned in the text, 
perhaps other management techniques or behaviors that would help avoid the 
problem described altogether, for example, “What about species reintroduction.”  If 
participants describe alternatives or the importance of alternative behaviors that are 
not stated in the text, score the thought as a 2; if not, continue. 
 
Seeking Clarification And/Or Challenge 
Participants may ask questions about the topic described.  If these questions are 
about the information in the passage itself or about themselves in the context of the 
information, score it as 1.  If it is speculation about the future of a specific species 
or general outcome with no extension of the concept itself, score the thought as a 3 
and continue.  For example, “what will happen to the snakes” is speculation 
whereas “Have people always exceeded carrying capacity of their region” is 
seeking clarification. 
 
Deriving An Overall Evaluation Of, Or Attitude Toward, The Issue Being Presented 
Deriving an overall opinion or attitude is based on a judgment of some sort.  
Participants may show their overall opinion by stating agreement or disagreement 
with the information in the passage, or may describe more specific attitudes toward 




An attitude is a pro or con statement about something as opposed to a general 
feeling. For example, “We are a huge part of this problem” shows that a judgment 
has been made, as opposed to a expressing a feeling.  If this is the case, score the 
thought as a 4. If not, and if it has not met any of the criteria described above, score 
























ACTIVE SYSTEMS FRAME (PART OF NATURE) 
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Picture a 5-gallon water-cooler bottle.  When you tip it over, the water glugs 
slowly out of the narrow neck of the bottle.  The size of the neck limits how quickly 
water pours out. Thomas Malthus, a political economist, observed that human population 
growth works similarly.  A population grows exponentially when unchecked, but the 
things needed by a population (e.g., food, water) do not, creating a “bottleneck” on 
population growth. This population has then reached its carrying capacity. 
Carrying capacity is the maximum number of a species (e.g., humans, 
earthworms, sagebrush) which can be supported without permanently damaging their 
homes. To find balance, we must consider the needs of our fellow species and future 
generations. 
For example, Easter Islanders enjoyed a well-developed society in a remote 
location.  As their population grew, they harvested certain tree species to extinction and 
could no longer build the wooden boats they used to fish.  Without access to their major 
food source, Islanders resorted to eating land birds.  Given this combination of diet and 
deforestation, they effectively condemned all land birds to extinction.  In just a few 
centuries, the people of Easter Island wiped out their forest, drove their plants and 
animals to extinction, and saw their complex society spiral into chaos, cannibalism, and, 
eventually, their own extinction. 
The collapse of this island system gives us insight into the repercussions of 
exceeding carrying capacity.  This same principle applies even when we can not 
immediately see the consequences in the complexity of our globalized system.  We can 
use the principle of carrying capacity to inform our choices and to recognize the 






















ACTIVE NONSYSTEMS FRAME (APART FROM NATURE) 
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Picture an old-fashioned water barrel.  This water-barrel has sides made of 
wooden staves, each one a different length.  The shortest stave limits the amount of water 
the barrel holds.  A German botanist named Liebig observed that plant growth works 
similarly.  Each barrel stave represents a resource, whether it be light, nutrients, or water.  
Whatever resource runs out first is the limit to growth.  We call this idea carrying 
capacity when applied to populations.  Ecologists recognized the breadth of this concept 
and have applied Liebig’s idea to populations of all species, not just plants. 
Carrying capacity is defined as the maximum population of a given species (e.g., 
earthworms, sagebrush, elk) that can be supported without permanently impairing the 
productivity of a habitat.  Managers try to balance the resources needed by current 
populations with those needed by future populations, as well as with the resources needed 
by other species.   
For example, Guam is an isolated tropical Pacific island with a high percentage of 
endemic species, including over 600 species of native plants.  Cargo ships inadvertently 
brought brown tree snakes to the island, and without any natural predators, their 
population exploded.  Snakes hunted 9 of the 11 native bird species and 2 of the 3 native 
bat species to extinction.  With so many birds and bats gone, many of them important 
pollinators, researchers now predict the local extinction of many native plants as well. 
Without suppressing snake populations, managers predict populations of many species 
will eventually be driven to extinction.  
We can see how resources limit populations in this island system. Resource 
managers can balance current and future resource needs as well as the resource needs of 
one population with another by understanding carrying capacity.  Managers across the 
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globe use the principle of carrying capacity to manipulate resources, like shortening and 
























PASSIVE SYSTEMS FRAMES (PART OF) 
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Picture a 5-gallon water cooler bottle.  When tipped over, water glugs slowly out 
the narrow neck of the bottle.  How quickly water can be poured out is limited by the size 
of the neck.  It has been observed by political economists that human population growth 
operates similarly.  A “bottleneck” limit on population growth is created when the things 
needed by a population (e.g., food, water) do not grow exponentially as the population 
does.  Carrying capacity has then been reached by the population. 
The maximum number of a species (e.g., humans, earthworms, sagebrush) which 
can be supported without permanently damaging their homes is termed carrying capacity. 
To find balance, the needs of our fellow species and future generations must be 
considered.  
On a remote island, a well-developed society was enjoyed by Easter Islanders.  As 
their population grew, certain tree species were harvested to extinction and the wooden 
boats used for fishing could no longer be built.  Without access to a major food source, 
eating land birds was their last resort.  Given this combination of diet and deforestation, 
all land birds were effectively condemned to extinction.  In just a few centuries, forests 
were wiped out, plants and animals were driven to extinction, and a complex society 
spiraled into chaos, cannibalism, and eventually its own extinction. 
Insight into the cascading repercussions of exceeding carrying capacity can be 
seen through the collapse of this island system.  This same principle is applied even when 
simple feedback loops are obscured in the complexity of a globalized system.  The 
principle of carrying capacity can be used to inform choices and the recognition that the 



























Picture an old-fashioned water barrel.  This water-barrel has sides made of 
wooden staves, each a different length.  The amount of water the barrel holds is limited 
by the shortest stave.  It was observed by a German botanist that plant growth works 
similarly.  A resource is represented by each barrel stave, whether it be light, nutrients, or 
water.  The limit to growth is whatever resource runs out first.  Applied to populations, 
this is called carrying capacity.  The breadth of this concept was recognized by ecologists 
and this idea has been applied to populations of all species, not just plants. 
The maximum population of a given species (e.g., earthworms, sagebrush, elk) 
that can be supported without permanently impairing the productivity of a habitat is 
defined as carrying capacity.  Balancing the resources needed now with those needed by 
future populations, and balancing the needs of one population with another is the goal of 
resource managers. 
For example, Guam is an isolated tropical Pacific island with a high percentage of 
endemic species, including more than 600 native plants.  Brown tree snakes were 
inadvertently brought to the island, and without any natural predators, their population 
exploded.  Nine of the 11 native bird species as well as 2 of the 3 bat species were hunted 
to extinction by the snakes.  With so many birds and bats gone, many of them important 
pollinators, the local extinction of several native plants is predicted.  Without suppressing 
snake populations it is believed that many species will eventually be driven to extinction.  
In this island system, the ways that populations are limited by resources can be 
seen.  Understanding carrying capacity, the current and future resource needs of a 
population can be balanced as can the resource needs of one population relative to 
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another.  The principle of carrying capacity of manipulation of resources is used by 
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